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Debunking Intellectual Property Myths:  
Cross-Cultural Experiments on Perceptions 
of Property 
Gregory N. Mandel,* Kristina R. Olson,** & Anne A. Fast*** 
For decades, the prevailing view in the United States and 
many Western countries has been that China does not 
appropriately respect intellectual property rights. These beliefs lie 
at the heart of President Donald Trump’s current trade war with 
China. Despite substantial geopolitical debate over differences 
between American and Chinese attitudes towards intellectual 
property rights, and despite the critical effects that such attitudes 
have on international economic markets and the function of 
intellectual property systems, empirical evidence of these attitudes 
is largely lacking. This Article presents original experimental 
survey research that explores cross-cultural differences between 
American and Chinese attitudes towards intellectual property 
rights, personal property rights, and real property rights. 
The results of the studies are somewhat counterintuitive. 
First, Chinese participants are found to have more consistent 
preferences towards different types of property rights than 
Americans. In a series of vignettes designed to test attitudes 
towards patented subject matter, copyrighted subject matter, 
tangible personal property, and real property, Chinese responses 
were more consistent and less context driven. Second, Americans 
do identify a preference for stronger intellectual property rights 
than Chinese, but only where infringement is committed by a 
private party for private benefit. Where infringement is conducted 
for public benefit, whether by a private or a governmental entity, 
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Chinese and Americans tend to have the same attitudes towards 
intellectual property rights. Third, Americans display a lower 
regard for intellectual property rights than for tangible property 
rights in most contexts, a differential that is not echoed in Chinese 
responses. The distinctions that Americans draw based on the use 
to which property is put, and between intellectual property and 
tangible property, is not consistent with United States law. 
Our experiments reveal that the ongoing debates over Chinese 
attitudes towards intellectual property rights miss the mark in 
certain regards. Chinese and American preferences for property 
rights are more similar than most have assumed, and the manners 
in which they differ are inconsistent with most proffered theories. 
These results provide important lessons for the future of 
international intellectual property rights relations, discourse, 
and enforcement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For decades, the prevailing view among Western governments, 
industries, and experts has been that the Chinese government and 
populace have a widespread disregard for intellectual property 
rights.1 This assessment has led to significant trade, political, and 
economic disputes.2 China has enacted a series of stronger, more 
Westernized intellectual property laws during this period.3 
Although China’s approach to intellectual property is 
strengthening, many in the United States and other Western 
countries still believe that, despite China’s tougher intellectual 
property laws, it is not doing enough to enforce these rights and 
that infringement runs rampant.4 Such beliefs are the primary 
1. ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 167 (2005); Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the 
BRIC Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 333 (2006) (“The sheer volume of copyright and 
trademark piracy in China is staggering.”); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know: 
Revealing the New China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 773, 773 (2011) (“The 
long-held and virtually unquestioned view about China from the United States and other 
Western nations is that China has a total disregard for intellectual property rights.”); Shruti 
Rana, The Global Battle over Copyright Reform: Developing the Rule of Law in the Chinese Business 
Context, 53 STAN. J. INT’L L. 89, 92 (2017) (“[B]usinesses and governments around the world 
have repeatedly singled out Chinese companies as among the world’s most notorious 
copyright pirates.”). 
2. Bird, supra note 1, at 329; Julia Cheng, China’s Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit 
of TRIPS Requires an Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1941, 1943 
(1998); Rana, supra note 1, at 91; Wei Shi & Robert Weatherley, Harmony or Coercion?  
China-EU Trade Dispute Involving Intellectual Property Enforcement, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 439,  
442–43 (2007). 
3. Bird, supra note 1, at 334; Scott J. Palmer, An Identity Crisis: Regime Legitimacy and 
the Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China, 8 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 449, 450 (2001); 
Rana, supra note 1, at 91–92. 
4. Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon Is Over: The U.S.-China WTO Intellectual Property 
Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, 105 (2008); Rana, supra note 1, at 126 (noting that while 
China has made significant efforts, some believe that such efforts and enforcement are 
lacking); Anne M. Wall, Intellectual Property Protection in China: Enforcing Trademark Rights, 17 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 341, 416 (2006); William Weightman, China’s Progress on Intellectual 
Property Rights (Yes, Really), THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 20, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/ 
2018/01/chinas-progress-on-intellectual-property-rights-yes-really/ (“China has become 
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driver of the current trade war between the United States 
and China.5 
A number of experts have argued that the challenges of 
intellectual property enforcement in China are unsurprising 
because efforts to introduce Western notions of intellectual 
property rights into China largely have ignored the differences 
between Chinese and Western values, cultures, and institutions.6 
Rather, Western nations have attempted to compel China to ramp 
up intellectual property protection through diplomatic and 
financial pressure.7 This goal, for example, is an explicit objective of 
increasingly innovative and has demonstrated a serious resolve to enforce an effective  
IPR regime.”). 
5. Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Additional Proposed Section 301 Remedies, 
WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ 
statement-president-donald-j-trump-additional-proposed-section-301-remedies/ 
(“Following a thorough investigation under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) determined that China has repeatedly engaged in 
practices to unfairly obtain America’s intellectual property. . . . China’s illicit trade practices 
− ignored for years by Washington − have destroyed thousands of American factories and 
millions of American jobs.”); Statement by the President Regarding Trade with China, 
WHITE HOUSE (June 15, 2018) [hereinafter Statement by the President Regarding Trade with China 
(June 15, 2018)], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-
regarding-trade-china/ (“China has, for example, long been engaging in several unfair 
practices related to the acquisition of American intellectual property and technology.”); 
U.S. Delegation, Section 2: Protection of American Technology and Intellectual Property, 
BALANCING THE TRADE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, https://xqdoc.imedao.com/16329fa0c8b2da913fc9058b.pdf (providing 
a variety of intellectual property demands among the United States’ list of demands before 
talks in Beijing to try to resolve the trade dispute); see Bryce Baschuk, U.S. Takes Aim at China 
in WTO, Escalating Stakes of Trade War, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X640AKN0000000?bna_news_filter=ip-
law&jcsearch=BNA%2520000001668c0ed347ad778fdee8250000#jcite (discussing the United 
States WTO complaint against Chinese intellectual property rights practices).
6. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 2 (1995); see Jennifer A. Crane, Riding the Tiger: A 
Comparison of Intellectual Property Rights in the United States and the People’s Republic of China, 
7 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 95 (2008) (reaching the same conclusion); Peter K. Yu, From 
Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. 
U. L. REV. 131 (2000) (also reaching the same conclusion).
7. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 1; Bird, supra note 1, at 334 (“Threats of a trade war 
encouraged China to enact more stringent copyright laws and close pirating factories.”); 
Patricia E. Campbell & Michael Pecht, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Intellectual Property 
Protections in China, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 69, 72–75 (2012); Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana: 
United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist 
World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 179, 211, 222 (1999) (“The United States  
relied on pressure, more than assistance, in its quest to influence the shape of China’s  
intellectual property law.”); Gregory N. Mandel, Leveraging the International Economy of  
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President Donald Trump’s increased tariffs on Chinese goods.8 
Trying to implement intellectual property via pressure, however, 
will not incorporate its concepts into the culture and consciousness 
of Chinese people.9 As a consequence of this approach, there is a 
disconnect between China’s reasons for implementing intellectual 
property laws and the evolution of popular attitudes towards 
the laws. 
Despite the long-running debates over intellectual property 
protection and about differing American versus Chinese attitudes 
towards intellectual property rights, no one has ever tested these 
underlying hypotheses. This is striking, particularly given the 
current trade disputes and that America and China lead the world 
in granting intellectual property rights.10 There are data that 
Intellectual Property, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 738–39 (2014) (discussing the diplomatic and 
financial pressures); Shi & Weatherley, supra note 2, at 445 (“Since the beginning of the 1990s, 
in order to achieve instant improvement of IPR enforcement, the United States has frequently 
leveraged a series of unilateral mechanisms—trade wars, non-renewal of Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) status, and opposition to entry into the WTO—to push China towards 
stronger protection of the U.S. IPR.”). 
8. Presidential Memorandum, Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 
Investigation of China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, 
Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 13099 (Mar. 22, 2018) (discussing the 
actions the United States will take in response to the Trade Representative’s findings that 
China is harming American intellectual property); Statement from President Donald J. Trump 
on Additional Proposed Section 301 Remedies, supra note 5 (“On April 3, 2018, the USTR 
announced approximately $50 billion in proposed tariffs on imports from China as an initial 
means to obtain the elimination of policies and practices identified in the investigation. . . . 
[T]he United States is still prepared to have discussions in further support of our 
commitment to achieving free, fair, and reciprocal trade and to protect the technology and 
intellectual property of American companies and American people.”); Statement by the 
President Regarding Trade with China (June 15, 2018), supra note 5 (“These tariffs are essential 
to preventing further unfair transfers of American technology and intellectual property to 
China, which will protect American jobs.”); Statement from the President Regarding Trade with 
China, WHITE HOUSE (June 18, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-president-regarding-trade-china-2/ (“China apparently has no 
intention of changing its unfair practices related to the acquisition of American intellectual 
property and technology. Rather than altering those practices, it is now threatening United 
States companies, workers, and farmers who have done nothing wrong.”).
9. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 54; Crane, supra note 6; Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and 
Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property 
Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 3, 16 (2001); see also Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The 
Battle to Define Asia’s Intellectual Property Law: From TPP to RCEP, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 331 
(2018) (discussing current debates over intellectual property treaties among various Asian 
countries including China and treaties with respect to the United States). 
10. See, e.g., Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2018?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
ORG., http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_pct_201 8.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2020) (identifying the United States and China as first and second, 
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indicate higher intellectual property infringement rates in China 
than in the United States.11 It is not feasible, however, to extrapolate 
from these data to reach conclusions about actual American and 
Chinese attitudes. A differential in infringement rates could result 
from different attitudes towards intellectual property rights, but it 
could also result from different efforts or means of enforcement, 
different economic pressures, or other factors. 
Social and cultural psychologists have studied the cultural 
differences between Americans and Chinese in a variety of other 
contexts.12 Such research has found that East Asians tend to have a 
more collectivistic and interdependent view of the self, while 
Westerners tend to have a more individualistic and independent 
view.13 These results are consistent with some of the arguments 
about the effects of Chinese and American cultures on attitudes 
towards intellectual property rights, but none of the studies have 
examined attitudes towards intellectual or other property rights. 
The present study is designed to begin to remedy this gap. 
We recruited American college students at a large American 
university and Chinese college students at a large Chinese 
respectively, in Patent Cooperation Treaty application filings by country in 2018); Who Filed 
the Most Madrid Trademark Applications in 2018?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_madrid_2018.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2020) (identifying the United States, Germany, and China as first 
through third, respectively, in Madrid Agreement trademark application filings by country 
in 2018). 
11. See, e.g., Matt Rosoff, The Countries Where People Steal the Most Data, BUS. INSIDER 
(July 7, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.sg/software-piracy-rates-and-value-by-
country-2016-7/?r=US&IR=T (“Software piracy is a lot more rampant in China than the U.S., 
but the value of unlicensed software in the U.S. is still the highest in the world.”). 
12. Guo-Ming Chen, Differences in Self-Disclosure Patterns Among Americans Versus 
Chinese: A Comparative Study, 26 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCH. 84, 84–91 (1995); Rosina C. Chia, 
Jamie L. Moore, Ka Nei Lam, C.J. Chuang & B.S. Cheng, Cultural Differences in Gender Role 
Attitudes Between Chinese and American Students, 31 SEX ROLES 23, 23–30 (1994); Li-Jun Ji, 
Kaiping Peng & Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Control, and Perception of Relationships in the 
Environment, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 943, 943–55 (2000); Michael W. Morris & 
Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and Chinese Attributions for Social and Physical 
Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 949, 949–71 (1994); Deborah Stipek, Differences 
Between Americans and Chinese in the Circumstances Evoking Pride, Shame, and Guilt, 29 J. CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCH. 616, 616–29 (1998). 
13. Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and Self: Implications for 
Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCH. REV. 223, 223–53 (1991); Daphna Oyserman & 
Spike Wing-Sing Lee, Priming “Culture”: Culture as Situated Cognition, in HANDBOOK OF 
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 255, 255–79 (Shinobu Kitayama & Dov Cohen eds., 2007); Harry C. 
Triandis, Individualism-Collectivism and Personality, 69 J. PERSONALITY 907, 907–24 (2001). 
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university to take part in a series of survey experiments designed 
to test attitudes towards intellectual property, personal property, 
and real property rights. These studies do not test whether the 
United States’ or China’s property laws are apt, or whether their 
levels of enforcement are sufficient. Rather, the studies explore 
popular American and Chinese beliefs about the appropriateness 
of various types of property rights protection. 
The results were somewhat surprising. When queried about 
support for personal, real, and intellectual property rights in 
general, Americans and Chinese supported property rights in each 
category at about the same level. When queried about specific 
scenarios involving property rights, however, Americans tended 
to prefer stronger property rights than Chinese. That said, 
the American responses were highly context dependent and, in 
some situations, American and Chinese responses were not 
statistically different. 
The specific scenarios we tested included a variety of types of 
property (patent, copyright, personal, and real) and a variety of 
types of taking of property rights (a private party taking for a 
private purpose, a private party taking for a public purpose, and a 
public entity taking for a public purpose). Chinese responses to 
these differing circumstances were substantially more consistent 
than Americans across the twelve scenarios (four property domains 
by three taking types). Regardless of the type of property at issue, 
the entity taking the property, and the use to which the property 
was being put, Chinese participants gave relatively similar answers 
about their preferences for property rights. American responses, on 
the other hand, varied significantly. 
The divisions that Americans drew concerning property rights 
were largely inconsistent with actual property law in the United 
States. For example, American participants drew a sharp 
distinction depending on the use to which property was being put. 
Americans were strongly opposed to property being taken for a 
private purpose (by a private party). They were close to equipoise, 
however, when property was taken for a public goal, regardless of 
whether a private or public party took the property. This distinction 
between a private party taking property for a private purpose 
versus for a public purpose is not supported in the law. 
Intriguingly, Americans (and Chinese) also concluded that 
personal property should be protected to a greater extent than 
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patents, copyrights, or land. This preference for personal property 
rights existed whether the land rights infringed involved merely 
trespass or the full taking of real property. This distinction also is 
not consistent with the law. 
The results reported here shed some light on long-running 
debates over the purpose of property law. The American responses, 
favoring the use to which property is put over the rights of the 
user, indicate that public preferences are more consistent with 
a utilitarian, rather than deontological, view of private property 
rights. The strong protection of personal property rights 
also provides some support for personhood-based theories of 
property law. 
Taken as a whole, these studies also indicate that those on all 
sides of the debates over Chinese attitudes towards intellectual 
property law have been making erroneous assumptions. Chinese 
attitudes towards intellectual property track Chinese attitudes 
towards tangible property relatively closely. It is not the case that 
Chinese tend to think of intellectual property exceptionally, but 
that they appear to have different attitudes towards property rights 
in general than Americans, a difference that is hardly surprising 
given China’s different history and culture. 
Further, Chinese attitudes towards intellectual property rights 
bear significant resemblance to American attitudes in certain 
regards—greater resemblance than many would likely predict. 
For example, in both the copyright and patent protection scenarios, 
Americans and Chinese had statistically similar responses for both 
private and public takings so long as they are for public purposes. 
The Chinese and American responses differed more in the personal 
and real property scenarios than in the intellectual property 
vignettes. These results have significant implications for the 
future of international intellectual property rights enforcement 
and discourse. 
This Article is presented in three parts. Part I describes the 
differing histories of intellectual, personal, and real property rights 
in China and the United States. This Part also surveys prior 
psychological research on cultural differences between Americans 
and Chinese. We present our study design, methodology, and 
results in Part II. Part III discusses the implications of our survey 
experiments with respect to American and Chinese attitudes 
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towards property rights in general and international intellectual 
property debates in particular. 
I. CULTURE, PROPERTY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In 1995, William Alford published his seminal work on 
intellectual property law and culture, To Steal a Book is an Elegant 
Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization (hereinafter 
To Steal a Book).14 In this volume, Alford attacked the received 
wisdom of both Chinese and Western scholars that imperial China 
(221 BC–AD 1911) had developed an indigenous type of intellectual 
property rights.15 Rather, Alford argued, scholars had 
misconstrued governmental control as intellectual property law, 
and in fact Chinese social and political culture created an 
environment that was largely antithetical to the notion of private 
intellectual property rights.16 To Steal a Book received significant 
acclaim and has become one of the most heavily cited intellectual 
property books of all time.17 While many concurred and were 
convinced by Alford’s argument,18 others criticized it as not fully 
representative or a misunderstanding of Chinese culture.19 
14. ALFORD, supra note 6. 
15. Id. at 2 (citing CHENGSI ZHENG & MICHAEL PENDLETON, COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA 
(CCH International 1991)); Richard Adelstein & Steven Peretz, The Competition of Technologies 
and Market for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use—An Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 209 (1985); Zou Shencheng, Baohu Banquan Shi Yu He Shi Heguo (The Protection of 
Copyright Started When and in What Country?), 63 FAXUE YANJIU (RSCH. LEGAL 
STUD.) 63 (1984). 
16. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 119. 
17. A LexisNexis search for the title, for example, returns over 250 citation results.
18. E.g., David Briglia, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law 
in Chinese Civilization by William P. Alford, 19 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 343, 347 (1995) 
(“William Alford offers a concise, remarkably readable, and illuminative account of the 
cultural history behind China’s vexing intractability.”); Thomas Buoye, William P. Alford, To 
Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization, 40 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 514 (1996) (“If Alford is correct, and I believe he is . . . .”); Charles R. Stone, 
What Plagiarism Was Not: Some Preliminary Observations on Classical Chinese Attitudes Toward 
What the West Calls Intellectual Property, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 199, 207–09 (2008) (concluding that 
“Alford’s book accurately explains” that Chinese authors rarely thought of copying from 
other works as stealing, even when copying whole chapters, because the rephrasing of 
historical works was considered inaccurate); Guy Yonay, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant
Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 537, 541 
(1995) (referring to Alford’s analysis as “convincing” and stating, “[i]n all, the book proposes 
an excellent theory of legal history in China and of legal change in general”).
19. Wei Shi, Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an Elegant 
Offense?, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REGUL. 1, 12 (2006) (arguing that Alford has 
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The history of intellectual property rights and private property 
rights in China is lengthy and complex. Though the history of such 
property rights in the United States is more linear, it too contains 
nuances. The following sections provide an overview of intellectual 
property, personal property, and real property rights in China and 
the United States. 
A. Intellectual Property Rights Across Cultures
Prior to Alford’s work, scholars tended to believe that the 
concept of copyright protection arose in various societies following 
their invention of mass printing techniques.20 Woodblock printing 
was invented during the Tang Dynasty (AD 618–907) in China,21 
and a number of historians trace the development of copyright 
protection in China to this period.22 Other scholars trace the 
development of copyright law in China to the invention of movable 
type during the Song Dynasty (AD 960–1279), which would still 
predate European copyright law by centuries.23 Correspondingly, 
misunderstood the Confucian perspective); Amy Rosen, China vs. United States: A 
Cosmopolitan Copyright Comparison, 15 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. POL’Y 1 (2014) (“The scholarship 
that uses Confucianism to explain why intellectual property is not salient in Chinese culture, 
such as Alford’s, does not consider other factors and severely oversimplifies the complexities 
of Confucianism.”); Ken Shao, The Global Debates on Intellectual Property: What If China Is Not 
a Born Pirate?, 2010 INTELL. PROP. Q. 341 (contending that Alford presented an incomplete 
picture concerning the impact of Confucianism on intellectual property protection and 
enforcement in China); Anna M. Han, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual 
Property Law in Chinese Civilization by William P. Alford, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1265, 1269 
(1996) (arguing that Alford’s book is inconsistent and violates Alford’s own earlier 
admonition to take a comprehensive approach to the study of intellectual property); see also 
Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese Intellectual Property System, 67 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1045, 1094–97 (2018) [hereinafter Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship] (discussing Alford’s 
book and the diversity of philosophic and cultural strands within Chinese history and 
culture). 
20. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 9; Stone, supra note 18; ZHENG & PENDLETON, supra note 
15, at 11. 
21. SUSAN DOYLE, JALEEN GROVE & WHITNEY SHERMAN, HISTORY OF ILLUSTRATION 76 
(2018); PETER GANEA & THOMAS PATTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA 205 
(Christopher Heath ed., 2005). 
22. GUAN H. TANG, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN CHINA 65 (2011); Stone, 
supra note 18; ZHENG & PENDLETON, supra note 15; Shencheng, supra note 15. 
23. TANG, supra note 22, at 65–66; Stone, supra note 18. Certain of the claims that China 
invented “copyright protection” are actually rooted in notions of prohibiting plagiarism. Id. 
Intellectual property law is distinct from preventing plagiarism, though this is a common 
fallacy among lay individuals. Gregory N. Mandel, Anne A. Fast & Kristina R. Olson, 
Intellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism Fallacy, 2015 BYU L. REV. 915 (2016) [hereinafter 
Plagiarism Fallacy]; see also Gregory N. Mandel, What Is IP for? Experiments in Lay and Expert 
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the development of Western copyright law has its origins in 
the invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century and 
the widespread dissemination of printed matter that this 
invention enabled.24 
1. Intellectual property development in China
Alford challenged the conventional understanding that
Chinese intellectual property law developed in imperial China.25 In 
his view, imperial Chinese law did include restrictions on 
publication and reprinting of materials, but these restrictions were 
based on the desire to control the dissemination of heterodox 
materials, not to protect authorial rights.26 Thus, at various historic 
times, China maintained laws requiring prepublication review of 
printed matter and prohibiting the unauthorized reproduction of 
government materials.27 These laws were designed to control the 
dissemination of ideas for purposes related to governmental 
legitimization, political order, and stability, rather than to provide 
any form of private intellectual property protection for authors or 
printers.28 Similarly, claims of early Chinese protection of 
trademarks also reflect the government’s exercise of its authority 
for the purposes of controlling expression and the dissemination of 
what it viewed as unfavorable symbols.29 
The absence of intellectual property law in imperial China is not 
entirely surprising given certain qualities of Eastern and Chinese 
culture. Eastern cultures tend to view creativity as integrating 
contributions from many people and sources across time into a 
current idea or invention.30 Confucius famously stated, “I transmit 
Perceptions, 90 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 659 (2016) (reporting that intellectual property attorney 
opinions differ from lay public opinion concerning the basis for intellectual property rights). 
24. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) (“From 
its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in 
technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment—the printing 
press—that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection.”); Gary D. Liebcap, 
Property Rights in Economic History: Implications for Research, 23 EXPLS. ECON. HIST. 227 (1986). 
25. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 9. 
26. Id. at 16–17. 
27. Yu, supra note 9, at 4; ALFORD, supra note 6, at 17. 
28. Yu, supra note 9, at 4; ALFORD, supra note 6, at 17, 24.
29. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 24–25. 
30. Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of 
Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 327 (2010); Stone, supra note 
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rather than create,” seeing his role as restating and passing on the 
wisdom and insights of his ancestors without necessarily adding 
anything new.31 Under this view, copying is not only permissible, 
but a noble way to show respect for one’s ancestors; to the contrary, 
it is private ownership that is immoral.32 The emphasis on 
cooperative effort, the focus on society rather than the individual, 
and the importance of links to the past all militate against thinking 
of intellectual creation and innovation as entitled to private 
property protection.33 
Conceptions of a sovereign’s role in Chinese culture also likely 
contributed to the lack of intellectual property protection. 
Traditionally, a ruler in China was viewed as bearing a fiduciary 
and moral duty to the populace, one that placed the responsibility 
for nurturing the development of citizens in the ruler’s hands.34 
From this perspective, respect for the ruler’s decisions concerning 
appropriate ideas and material to disseminate is unsurprising.35 
This understanding helps to explain Chinese governmental 
restrictions on publication during the imperial period. Although 
the government did sometimes protect printers from republication 
of their works, and guilds from the reproduction of certain symbols 
and materials, the printers and guilds had no individual rights.36 
Rather, the government exercised its authority in these cases 
in order to maintain political control over discourse and foster 
social harmony.37 
The lack of intellectual property protection in China was not a 
significant issue for China until trade with the West began to open 
18; Carla Hesse, The Rise of Intellectual Property, 700 B.C.–A.D. 2000: An Idea in the Balance, 131 
DÆDALUS 26, 27 (2002); Yu, supra note 9, at 16–19; ALFORD, supra note 6, at 19–20. But see WEI 
SHI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM: EU-CHINA PERSPECTIVE 
106–07 (2008) (contending role of Confucian philosophy is overstated and inaccurate). 
31. Hesse, supra note 30, at 27; Yu, supra note 9, at 19. 
32. Yu, supra note 9, at 16–21; Patrick H. Hu, “Mickey Mouse” in China: Legal and 
Cultural Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. INT’L L.J. 81, 104 (1996). 
33. Edward J. Walneck, The Patent Troll or Dragon?: How Quantity Issues and Chinese 
Nationalism Explain Recent Trends in Chinese Patent Law, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 435 
(2014); Brent T. Yonehara, Enter the Dragon: China’s WTO Accession, Film Piracy and Prospects 
for the Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 389 (2002); Stone, supra note 18; 
ALFORD, supra note 6, at 19–20. 
34. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 19–23. 
35. Id. at 24. 
36. Id. at 24–25. 
37. Id.; Yu, supra note 9, at 4. 
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up in the nineteenth century.38 Initially, this trade involved bulk 
commodities (such as tea, raw silk, and opium), rendering 
trademark or other intellectual property protection unnecessary.39 
As trade relationships evolved and brand names became more 
important, the need for some form of trademark protection was 
more pressing.40 In part as a result, China entered into treaties with 
Western nations in the early twentieth century that included 
trademark, patent, and copyright provisions.41 These treaties, 
however, failed to establish a functional intellectual property 
regime. For example, although they provided for trademark 
registration, they did not require registration, identify who could 
register a mark, or specify the rights provided by registration.42 
In a similar vein, the patent provisions of the treaties provided that 
foreign rights would exist only after China created a patent office 
and enacted patent laws, but provided no timetable for 
such action.43 
The end of dynastic Chinese rule in the early twentieth century 
led to a period of instability before the Kuomintang and Chiang 
Kai-shek took power in 1928.44 China began to enact substantive 
trademark, copyright, and patent laws at this time.45 There 
remained, however, almost no practical enforcement, or even 
popular awareness, of such laws during this period.46 As Alford 
writes, “fundamentally, these laws failed to achieve their stated 
objectives because they presumed a legal structure, and indeed, a 
38. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 32–34; Yu, supra note 9, at 5–6. 
39. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 33–38. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 37–38; TANG, supra note 22, at 66. The first intellectual property laws in China 
were enacted in the early twentieth century, including the Great Qing Copyright Law of 
1910. See NORWOOD F. ALLMAN, HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF TRADE-MARKS, PATENTS, 
COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADE-NAMES IN CHINA 112–21 (1924) (providing an English translation of 
the law); Li Yufeng & Catherine W. Ng, Understanding the Great Qing Copyright Law of 1910, 
56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 767 (2009). 
42. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 37. 
43. Id. at 38. 
44. CONRAD SCHIROKAUER & MIRANDA BROWN, A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINESE 
CIVILIZATION 286 (2012). 
45. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 50–51; Brian J. Safran, A Critical Look at Western Perceptions 
of China’s Intellectual Property System, 3 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 135, 138 (2012). 
46. See ALFORD, supra note 6, at 52–55; Campbell & Pecht, supra note 7. 
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legal consciousness, that did not then exist in China and, most 
likely, could not have flourished at that time.”47 
The Communist Party and Mao Zedong came to power in 1949 
and ushered in a new, socialist political and economic system of 
government.48 Socialist concepts of intellectual property were more 
consistent with traditional Chinese notions of creation than 
Western intellectual property ideals had been.49 Marx viewed 
invention and creation as a social, not individual, endeavor 
directed at a social product.50 Though Marxist views of the social 
nature of creation and Confucian views of the cultural nature of 
creation were significantly distinct, each conceived of creation as a 
collective endeavor, not an individual one. Consequently, neither 
supported private, individual intellectual property rights.51 In 
addition, the socialist perspective of the hierarchical need to control 
the flow of information to the populace was entirely consistent with 
the approach that had been taken in imperial China.52 
Communist China did enact certain types of intellectual 
property laws in the 1950s. These included a two-track approach to 
rights in inventions.53 The primary track involved the state granting 
certificates of invention to select inventors.54 The state had the right 
to use and authorize others to use the invention, while the inventor 
47. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 53. 
48. TIMOTHY CHEEK, MAO ZEDONG AND CHINA’S REVOLUTIONS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS 1 (2002); Safran, supra note 45, at 138–39. 
49. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 56–57; Yu, supra note 9, at 21–22. 
50. Jing-Kai Syz, Note, Expanding the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China: A 
Proposal for Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 5 J. CHINESE L. 349, 353 n.18 (1991); see 
KARL MARX, EARLY WRITINGS 157 (T. B. Bottomore ed. & trans., 1963) (“Even when I carry 
out scientific work, etc., an activity which I can seldom conduct in direct association with 
other men, I perform a social, because human, act.”); KARL MARX & FREDERICH ENGELS, 
CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, VOLUME I 330 n.4 (Frederich Engels, ed., 
Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling, trans., 1887) (“A critical history of technology  
would show how little any of the inventions of the 18th century are the work of a  
single individual.”). 
51. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 57; Yonehara, supra note 33, at 74–77. 
52. A saying in China during the Cultural Revolution was, “Is it necessary for a steel 
worker to put his name on a steel ingot that he produces in the course of his duty? If not, 
why should a member of the intelligentsia enjoy the privilege of putting his name on what 
he produces?” ALFORD, supra note 6, at 65. 
53. Id. at 57–58; PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 141–42 (Sweet & 
Maxwell Asia 2003); GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 21, at 2. 
54. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 57; FENG, supra note 53, at 141–42; GANEA & PATTLOCH,
supra note 21, at 2. 
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was entitled to recognition and financial rewards based on the 
savings produced by the invention.55 Alternatively, the inventor 
could receive patent-like rights entitling them to control over the 
use and distribution of the invention.56 Despite these laws, and 
other laws providing certain exclusive use rights for trademarks, 
there were only a handful of patents issued in this period and 
unauthorized infringement was widespread.57 There was no 
equivalent to copyright protection at this time, and the state 
exercised control over what was published, although the state 
could provide authors with “basic payments” based on the number 
of copies printed and a right to prevent alteration of a work.58 
These limited intellectual property protections were sharply 
curtailed during the cultural revolutions of the 1960s and replaced 
with laws that vested intellectual property rights exclusively with 
the state.59 As the government exercised growing control over the 
dissemination of ideas, materials, and discourse, citizens were 
encouraged and pressured to not even identify their roles in 
creation or invention.60 Following the end of the Cultural 
Revolution and arrest of the Gang of Four in the late 1970s, Deng 
Xiaoping came to power and ushered in the “four 
modernizations.”61 China began to revise its approach to 
intellectual property protection and the precursors to today’s laws 
were introduced.62 
China started to develop a more modern and Western 
intellectual property system in 1982, promulgating a new law for 
the protection of trademarks.63 In an effort to incentivize 
innovation, China also enacted a new and stronger Patent Law in 
55. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 57; FENG, supra note 53, at 141–42; GANEA & PATTLOCH,
supra note 21, at 3; Safran, supra note 45, at 138–39; see Gregory N. Mandel, Innovation Rewards: 
Towards Solving the Twin Market Failures of Public Goods, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 303 (2016) 
(proposing a rewards system based on benefit for public goods inventions). 
56. FENG, supra note 53, at 142; GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 21, at 3. 
57. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 61. 
58. Id. at 59–60; Hu, supra note 32, at 104–05. 
59. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 62–63. 
60. Id. at 63–64; see Yu, supra note 6, at 136–37. 
61. RICHARD BAUM, BURYING MAO: CHINESE POLITICS IN THE AGE OF DENG XIAOPING
81 (1996); LIBR. OF CONG. FED. RSCH. DIV., CHINA: A COUNTRY STUDY 54–58 (Robert L. 
Worden et al. eds., 1988); Safran, supra note 45, at 139. 
62. Campbell & Pecht, supra note 7, at 72; Safran, supra note 45, at 139–40.
63. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, effective Mar. 1, 1983). 
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1984.64 These laws were adopted over the objections of some that 
intellectual property rights were antithetical to socialist 
principles.65 In the early 1990s, China added a copyright law and a 
law prohibiting unfair competition.66 This series of laws 
represented a major shift in China’s approach to intellectual 
property protection, although initially the Chinese government 
made only limited efforts to enforce such rights.67 
As a result, through the 1980s and 1990s, intellectual property 
protection provided little remedy in China, and intellectual 
property infringement ran relatively rampant.68 In 1989 the United 
States placed China on its intellectual property Priority Watch List 
due to concerns about infringement, and in 1994, the United States 
Trade Representative famously referred to intellectual property 
rights enforcement in China as “sporadic at best and virtually non-
existent for copyrighted works.”69 During this period, copyright 
laws were sometimes used by the state to control the publication 
and dissemination of printed works.70 
In the twenty-first century, China re-enacted and amended 
many of its intellectual property laws, each time making them 
stronger and providing tougher enforcement rules.71 China also 
64. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985). 
65. GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 21, at 3; Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark and 
Patent Law in the People’s Republic of China, 21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 259, 282–83 (1986). 
66. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991); Law Against Unfair 
Competition of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993). 
67. GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 21, at 3; Graham J. Chynoweth, Reality Bites: How 
the Biting Reality of Piracy in China Is Working to Strengthen Its Copyright Laws, 2 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 1, 6 (2003) (referring to China’s 1990 copyright law and 1982 trademark law as 
having “produced more bark than bite”); see ALFORD, supra note 6, at 73–80, 85; Hu, supra 
note 32, at 105; Campbell & Pecht, supra note 7, at 74. 
68. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 85–92; Yu, supra note 6, at 146, 165; Yonehara, supra note 
33, at 66. 
69. CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30555, CHINA–U.S. TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMPLIANCE
ISSUES (2000), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20001207_RL30555_001f38e95f94b 
933570819b037242688bfe13d25.pdf; see Bird, supra note 1, at 339–40. 
70. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 79. 
71. The Patent Law was amended in 1992, 2000, and 2008, and a fourth revision of the 
Patent Law is currently under consideration. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 
2009), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=178664; Yu, Half-Century of 
Scholarship, supra note 19, at 1046. The Copyright Law was amended in 2001 and 2010. 
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began taking greater steps to enforce its intellectual property 
laws.72 During this period, China signed a number of international 
intellectual property rights treaties, culminating with China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 and concomitant 
entrance into the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 2001.73 Perhaps most 
significantly, over the last decade China has embarked upon an 
explicit national policy to improve the creation, use, and protection 
of intellectual property rights.74 
These steps have led to significant development of intellectual 
property rights in China. For example, in 2017 China had the 
second largest number of international applications filed under the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (to the United States) and the third 
largest number of Madrid Agreement trademark applications (to 
the United States and Germany).75 There are still complaints about 
the level of intellectual property rights enforcement in China,76 and 
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010), art. 4,  http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=186569; Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship, supra note 19, at 1046. A 
revised unfair competition law just became effective in 2018. Law of the People’s Republic of 
China Against Unfair Competition (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Nov. 4, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018); FENG, supra note 53, at ix; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates 
to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 
901, 906–23, 975 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, Pirates to Partners (Episode II)]; Weightman, supra note 4. 
72. Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor Is Far Away: China’s Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights Protection, 1986–2006,  7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 236 (2006); Nguyen, supra note 1, 
at 789–806; Yu, Pirates to Partners (Episode II), supra note 71, at 911; Jessica Jiong Zhou, 
Trademark Law & Enforcement in China: A Transnational Perspective, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 415, 431 
(2002); Weightman, supra note 4; see also Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship, supra note 19, at 1081–
82 (discussing the evolution of China’s intellectual property system from one that 
transplanted foreign laws to one that is focusing more on internal needs). 
73. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; TANG, supra note 22, at 70–71. 
74. State Intell. Prop. Off. of China, China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2008, 
CNIPA (July 17, 2013), http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/lawpolicy/white/915591.htm. 
75. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231; Who 
Filed the Most Madrid Trademark Applications in 2017?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_madrid_2017. 
pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2020); Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2017?,  
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/ 
infographic_pct_2017.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2020). 
76. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 28 (2017), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2017%20Special%20301%20Report%20FINAL.PDF 
(“Serious challenges in China continue to confront U.S. intellectual property (IP) right 
holders with respect to adequate and effective protection of IP, as well as fair and equitable 
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such disputes have boiled over into the current trade war between 
the United States and China,77 but there is also no question that 
China’s intellectual property system has developed remarkably 
rapidly and is continuing to do so.78 
2. Intellectual property development in the United States
In contrast to the laws in China, intellectual property laws have
been a mainstay in the United States since the founding of the 
republic. Patent, copyright, and trademark protection each had 
significant histories in Britain and continental Europe prior to the 
formation of the United States,79 and intellectual property 
protection existed in various American colonies prior to the 
American Revolution in 1776.80 The American Constitution grants 
Congress the power to enact patent and copyright laws in the 
Intellectual Property Clause of Article I.81 Congress wasted no time 
in exercising this authority, passing the first patent act at 
the beginning of its first term and the first copyright act the 
following month.82 
market access for U.S. persons that rely upon IP protection.”); USTR Announces Initiation of 
Section 301 Investigation of China, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/ustr-
announces-initiation-section (announcing a United States Trade Representative 
investigation of China’s intellectual property practices); Request for Consultations by the 
United States, China—Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1 (Mar. 23, 2018) (United States WTO complaint against Chinese 
intellectual property rights practices); Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection 
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 
2009) (United States complaint against Chinese intellectual property rights practices  
under TRIPS). 
77. Supra notes 6, 9. 
78. Rana, supra note 1, at 126; Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship, supra note 19, at 1049–50, 
1058–87. 
79. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 97 (2006); Crane, supra note 6, at 98. 
80. MAY & SELL, supra note 79, at 105; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution 
of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (5 Part I), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y  
615 (1996). 
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“[The Congress shall have Power t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
82. Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (“An Act to promote the progress of useful
Arts”); Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (“An Act for the encouragement of learning, 
by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such 
copies, during the times therein mentioned”). 
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American states provided trademark protection under their 
common law since the United States was formed,83 though the first 
federal trademark law was not enacted until 1870.84 This law was 
struck down by the Supreme Court as unsupported under the 
Intellectual Property Clause,85 but Congress enacted a new 
trademark act in 1881 pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, and 
this law was upheld.86 
These intellectual property laws have remained robust, and 
generally robustly enforced (at least domestically), since their 
inception.87 During the nineteenth century there was a period when 
the United States was widely recognized as an international 
intellectual property pirate.88 Subsequently, however, intellectual 
property rights have been strongly enforced, and the dominant 
strain of intellectual property discourse in the United States in the 
twenty-first century has  actually concerned whether it is too strong 
and too strictly enforced.89 
83. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92; J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:2 (5th ed. 2018); David S. Welkowitz, 
Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531, 532 (1991). 
84. Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198, 210–12 §§ 77–84 (“An Act to revise, consolidate, and 
amend the Statutes relating to Patents and Copyrights”); MCCARTHY, supra note 83, at § 5:3. 
85. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 99; MCCARTHY, supra note 83, at § 5:3. 
86. Act of March 3, 1881, 21 Stat. 502 (“An act to authorize the registration of trade-
marks and protect the same”); MCCARTHY, supra note 83, at § 5:3. 
87. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 21 (2009); Leah Chan Grinvald, Making Much Ado About Theory: The Chinese 
Trademark Law, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 53, 72–73 (2008). 
88. B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, History Lessons: The Early Development of 
Intellectual Property Institutions in the United States, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 233, 234–37 (2001); 
Geoffrey R. Scott, A Comparative View of Copyright as Cultural Property in Japan and the United 
States, 20 TEMP. INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. 283, 330 (2006); WILLIAM W. FISHER III, THE GROWTH OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF THE OWNERSHIP OF IDEAS IN THE UNITED STATES 11, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2020). The 
United States did not join the Berne Convention, granting reciprocal copyright protection to 
nationals of other signatories, until 1988. Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with 
Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 315–18, 
322–32 (2010); Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late Than Never: Implementation of the 1886 Berne 
Convention, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 171–77 (1989). The United States and China are not 
alone in shifting from weaker to stronger intellectual property systems as their countries 
become more technologically advanced. Similar shifts have taken place in a number of other 
countries. Mandel, supra note 7, at 764–65. 
89. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009) (concluding that patent 
protection should be weakened in certain regards based on an analysis indicating that 
litigation costs exceed patent-associated profits in certain industries); BURK & LEMLEY,  
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In contrast to Eastern cultures’ recognition of the contributions 
of many across time, Western cultures tend to romanticize 
individual authors and inventors as the sources of creative works 
and inventions.90 Immanuel Kant developed the romantic concept 
of an “author-genius,” an individual author whose work embodies 
the author’s spirit and who creates something entirely new and 
unprecedented.91 Scholars have analyzed how romantic notions of 
authorship have worked their way into American copyright law,92 
a result that is not surprising given that much American copyright 
law developed as common law during the height of the romantic 
period in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.93 Americans 
likewise idolize the achievements of individual, iconic inventors, 
such as Thomas Edison’s light bulb, Alexander Bell’s telephone, 
Jonas Salk’s polio vaccine, and Steve Jobs’s Apple products.94 The 
common conception of the “eureka” moment of invention, 
achieved by a single researcher, remains a classic paradigm in the 
West.95 In this cultural context, individualized, private intellectual 
property rights find an easy home. 
supra note 87, at 3 (discussing various critiques of the availability, strength, and breadth of 
patent protection). 
90. Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography 
of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996); Mandel, supra note 30, at 328; Rana, supra 
note 1, at 118. 
91. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, POLITICAL, AND
VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS (William Richardson ed. & trans., 1798); Martha 
Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of 
the ‘Author,’ 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 428–430 (1984) (discussing the development 
of the idea of an individual, idealized ‘author’). 
92. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 53–59 (1996); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 284 (1998); Peter 
Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 
496–500. 
93. BOYLE, supra note 92, at 53–59. 
94. See Gregory Mandel, Thomas Edison’s Patent Application for the Incandescent Light 
Bulb, in 2 MILESTONE DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 978, 979–80 (Paul Finkelman ed., 
2008); Elisabeth Crawford, Nobel: Always the Winners, Never the Losers, 282 SCIENCE 1256, 1257 
(1998); Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law and the 
Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1160–61 (1998); Jessica Silbey, The 
Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319 (2008). 
95. Kevin Dunbar, How Scientists Build Models: InVivo Science as a Window on the 
Scientific Method, in MODEL-BASED REASONING IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 85, 96 (Lorenzo 
Magnani et al. eds., 1999); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 1575, 1583 (2003) (“The prototypical innovation contemplated by the patent law is 
made by an individual inventor working in his garage after hours.”); Silbey, supra note 94, 
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B. Personal Property and Real Property Across Cultures
Like intellectual property rights, private rights in real property 
in America arose with the earliest British colonies and have existed 
consistently throughout the history of the United States.96 Private 
property rights are a fundamental basis of the American capitalist 
economy.97 Private ownership of real property provides incentives 
for owners to invest in and develop their property.98 A common 
utilitarian view of private property rights perceives that such rights 
internalize the externalities of property use and consequently 
incentivize the private owner to put the property to a more socially 
beneficial use.99 In a similar vein and for similar reasons, private 
ownership of personal property has been an unquestioned constant 
throughout the United States’ history.100 
Private rights in real and personal property have a more varied 
history in China. For millennia, the emperor owned and had 
absolute control over all property, both personal and real.101 When 
the Republic of China was established in 1911, private property still 
did not receive any protection.102 Although a 1930 Civil Code 
included provisions concerning “Rights over Things,” this code 
at 330. The image of a person yelling “Eureka!” upon a significant insight is traced to 
Archimedes, who had been searching for a way to measure the volume of an irregular object 
(in particular, a crown), getting into a bath and realizing that the volume of water displaced 
by his body was equal to the amount of his body submerged. He was so excited about his 
discovery that he ran through the streets shouting “Eureka” (Greek for “I have found it”). 
DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, ORIGINS OF GENIUS: DARWINIAN PERSPECTIVES ON CREATIVITY 
35 (1999). 
96. David A. Thomas, Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from a Shared 
History Part I: The Shared History, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 143 (1999); David A. Thomas, 
Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from a Shared History Part II: How Anglo-
American Land Law Diverged After American Colonization and Independence, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. 
& TR. J. 295 (1999). 
97. MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 54 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 
1986) (defining “Capitalism”); BRUCE R. SCOTT, THE CONCEPT OF CAPITALISM 66 (2009). 
98. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 
(1967); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property Is Only Another Name for Monopoly, 9 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 51 (2017). 
99. Demsetz, supra note 98, at 348, 356; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The 
Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1883 (2007). 
100. Rana, supra note 1, at 121. 
101. Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the 
Protection of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 317, 319–20, 324 (2008). 
102. Id. at 320. 
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was never applied due to the Japanese occupation and war.103 The 
Communist revolution in 1949 ushered in a new regime.104 
Traditional Marxist doctrine prohibits private property ownership 
as contrary to socialism.105 Under Mao, private property interests 
were prohibited and all private property was seized and 
transferred to state ownership.106 As Professor Mo Zhang writes, 
“[d]uring this period, people were trained to follow the lead of the 
proletariat (. . . the class of people with no assets or property)[,] . . . 
ma[king] it impossible for Chinese citizens to make any claims of 
property rights against the government[.]”107 
Deng Xiaoping’s four modernizations in the late 1970s involved 
a series of economic reforms and a shift towards more of a market 
economy.108 Part of the transition included greater recognition of 
private interests and personal liberty in general.109 This led to some 
degree of informal notions of private property rights between 
private parties, but the government did not formally acknowledge 
tangible private property rights until it amended its constitution 
in 2004.110 In 2007, China’s National People’s Congress passed the 
first law explicitly permitting certain private property rights, 
including rights over income and savings, housing, and a variety of 
tangible items.111 Under this law, private parties still cannot own 
103. Id. 
104. COLUMBIA CHRONOLOGIES OF ASIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE 70 (John S. Bowman 
ed., 2000); Richard Goldstein, Copyright Relations Between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China: An Interim Report, 10 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 403, 410 (1984); Sidel, supra  
note 65, at 261. 
105. HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, A THEORY OF SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS,
POLITICS AND ETHICS 2 (1989); Benjamin W. James, Expanding the Gap: How the Rural Property 
System Exacerbates China’s Urban-Rural Gap, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 451, 456 (2007). 
106. THE WRITINGS OF MAO ZEDONG, 1949–1976: VOLUME I, SEPTEMBER 1949–DECEMBER 
1955, at 351 (Michael Y. M. Kau & John K Leung eds., 1986); Daniel J. Morrissey, Managing 
the Wealth of Nations: What China and America May Have to Teach Each Other About Corporate 
Governance, 68 SMU L. REV. 831, 833 (2015); William D. Soileau, Past is Present: Urban Real 
Property Rights and Housing Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 
299 (1995); Zhang, supra note 101, at 324–26. 
107. Zhang, supra note 101, at 320–21. 
108. COLUMBIA CHRONOLOGIES OF ASIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE, supra note 104; 
Soileau, supra note 106. 
109. Soileau, supra note 106; Zhang, supra note 101, at 323. 
110. Zhang, supra note 101, at 336. 
111. Ryan van Steenis, From Mao to Madison and Back: An Examination of China’s National 
Property Law and Its Diminished Potential, 23 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 35 (2009); Zhang, supra 
note 101, at 336–37. 
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real property, which is owned by the state or other public entities.112 
Private parties can own the right to use certain real property, as 
well as own any buildings on the land, while renting the land on 
long-term leases lasting up to seventy years.113 The law also 
includes protection for private owners against illegal seizures by 
the government.114 The evolution of private property rights in 
China was based on a desire to stimulate “people’s initiative to 
create and accumulate wealth and to promote social harmony” in 
an effort to drive the economy.115 As with intellectual property 
rights, China’s shift towards granting private protection for 
personal and real property rights was based on a desire to 
incentivize investment and development. China is currently 
working on a comprehensive civil code, one that is anticipated to 
further strengthen private property rights.116 
Given the differing histories of intellectual, personal, and real 
property rights in China and the United States, it is not surprising 
that people in these two countries have differing conceptions of 
property rights. The following section details current 
understanding around these differences. 
C. Psychological Conceptions of Property
A variety of psychological research has explored the cultural 
differences between Americans and Chinese.117 Prior research in 
social and cultural psychology has found differences in how East 
Asians versus Americans and Europeans tend to view 
112. Zhang, supra note 101, at 355. In China, real property in urban areas is owned by 
the state and real property in rural areas is owned by collectives. Id. 
113. Id. at 355–56. For residential buildings, this term may be automatically renewed. 
Id. at 356. 
114. Property Law of the People’s Republic of China, Order No. 62, Art. 42 
(Mar. 16, 2007), http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/ 
content_21897791.htm; Zhang, supra note 101, at 359 (describing the provisions for 
compensation in the case of expropriation, though noting that the law does not guarantee 
due process in relation to takings). 
115. Jim Yardley, China Nears Passage of Landmark Property Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/09/business/09yuan.html. 
116. Javier C. Hernandez & Owen Guo, China Pushes Legal Overhaul That Would Bolster 
State Power, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/world/ 
asia/xi-jinping-legal-overhaul.html. 
117. Chen, supra note 12, at 84–91; Chia et al., supra note 12, at 23–30; 
Ji et al., supra note 12, at 943–55; Morris et al., supra note 12, at 949–71; Stipek, supra note 12, 
at 616–29. 
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themselves.118 For example, East Asians have been found to have a 
more collectivist self-construal, viewing the self in terms of one’s 
relation to others, and holding what is considered an 
interdependent view of the self, in which people value their social 
group’s or family’s goals, needs, and abilities.119 In contrast, North 
Americans and Europeans have been found to be more 
individualistic, viewing the self as separate from others, and 
holding what is considered to be a more independent view of the 
self, emphasizing one’s own distinct goals, needs, and abilities.120 
Most relevant to the present work, a meta-analysis of numerous 
studies found that Chinese adults are more collectivistic and 
American adults are more individualistic.121 
These apparent cultural differences are likely interwoven with 
the distinct histories of property rights in China and America. That 
is, cultural differences may have led to some of the differences in 
each culture’s treatment of personal property, real property, and 
intellectual property, and the differing historical paths 
simultaneously may also produce differing cultural and social 
attitudes towards property rights today. 
Despite rich debates over the last several decades concerning 
differences between American and Chinese attitudes towards 
intellectual property rights, and despite the critical effects that such 
attitudes can have on intellectual property compliance and 
economic markets, to our knowledge no one has ever actually tried 
to test these attitudes. The studies reported here provide the first 
attempts to explore cross-cultural differences in attitudes towards 
intellectual property rights, personal property rights, and real 
property rights between Americans and Chinese. The somewhat 
counterintuitive results provide important lessons for the future 
of international intellectual property rights enforcement 
and discourse. 
118. Markus et al., supra note 13, at 223–53; Oyserman et al., supra note 13, at 255–79; 
Triandis, supra note 13, at 907–24. 
119. Markus et al., supra note 13, at 223–53; Daphna Oyserman, Heather M. Coon & 
Markus Kemmelmeier, Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical 
Assumptions and Meta-Analyses, 128 PSYCH. BULL. 3, 3–72 (2002). 
120. Markus et al., supra note 13, at 223–53; Oyserman et al., supra note 119. 
121. Oyserman et al., supra note 119. This meta-analysis analyzed 83 total studies, 
nine of which directly compared the United States and China (not counting Taiwan and 
Hong Kong). Id. 
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II. EXPERIMENTS ON CROSS-CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
As the above historical accounts reveal, the formal laws on the 
books do not necessarily translate into how law will be 
implemented in society. Rather, the enforcement and effectuation 
of law is subject to the political and social culture surrounding the 
formal law.122 In order to better comprehend how legal rules play 
out in practice, it is necessary to understand the social and 
intellectual environment in which the rules exist. The studies 
presented below examine the relation between law and culture in 
the United States and China for different types of property rights. 
Study 1 provides a pilot examination and Study 2 presents the 
primary examination that is the basis for the analysis in Part III. 
A. Study 1: Cross-Cultural Study of American College Students
Our first examination of cross-cultural perceptions of property 
rights was conducted by comparing college students from different 
cultural backgrounds. As in all of the studies reported here, we 
selected adult students who were not engaged in the study of law. 
In order to explore cross-cultural attitudes, we recruited White 
American, East Asian American, and East Asian International 
college students. White American and East Asian American 
participants were adults born in the United States who had 
not lived outside of the United States. East Asian participants 
were adults born in an East Asian country who arrived in the 
United States at sixteen years of age or older.123 These criteria were 
determined before the study began. 
122. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors 
in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 628 (1986) (discussing sociological research finding 
that, because laws are costly to learn and enforce, parties often ignore the formal law and 
instead create their own systems of informal norms and enforcement that work within their 
relationships and context). 
123. In an effort to attract a sufficient population size, as well as other reasons, it was 
more practical to select East Asian participants generally as opposed to limiting Study 1 
to Chinese students. As discussed below, Study 2 contains a cohort of solely 
Chinese participants. 
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1. Study 1 methodology
Participants. Participants were college students recruited at a
large university in the Pacific Northwest through the university’s 
online participant pool system that compensated participants 
with course credit for completing an online survey. The final 
sample included sixty White Americans, seventy-seven East Asian 
Americans, and sixty-one East Asians.124 The median ages 
and gender distribution of the three populations were similar.125 
The study materials included (1) vignette evaluations, (2) legal 
compliance questions, (3) a self-construal scale, and (4) 
demographic questions.126 Each of these sections is 
described below. 
Vignette evaluations. Participants received twelve vignettes 
reflecting a 4 (property domain) X 3 (transfer type) design. The four 
property domains were: (1) intellectual property protected by a 
patent (copying of a patented vaccine), (2) intellectual property 
protected by a copyright (copying of a copyrighted textbook), (3) 
personal property (taking a textbook), and (4) real property 
(trespassing on land). The three property transfer types were: (1) 
someone taking another person’s private property for his/her own 
benefit (private-for-private), (2) someone taking another person’s 
private property for a public use benefiting third parties 
(private-for-public), and (3) a public entity taking private property 
for a public use benefiting third parties (public-for-public). 
Following each vignette, participants were asked their “opinion 
about whether such action should or should not be allowed, 
regardless of what the law might actually be.” Specifically, 
participants were asked, “In your opinion, should [the property 
user’s] action be legally allowed?” (legal permissibility). Participants 
124. An additional 30 American participants completed the study, but were excluded 
from analyses either for not being the target race/ethnicity (n = 15), not being born in the 
United States (n = 2), or having lived outside of the United States for a significant period of 
time (n = 13). An additional 41 East Asian participants completed the study but were 
excluded from analyses either for not being the target race/ethnicity (n = 1) or arriving in 
the United States before 16 years of age (n = 40). 
125. White Americans: median age = 19.13 years, SD = 1.74 years; 55% female. East 
Asian Americans: median age = 19.38 years, SD = 1.64 years; 54% female. East Asians: 
median age = 20.23 years, SD = 3.32 years; 61% female. 
126. The online survey also included two short questions that are not included here, as 
they were pilot items for a future study examining perceptions of eminent domain. These 
questions were the very last items presented to participants. 
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reported their answers to each question using a slider scale ranging 
from 0 (definitely not allowed) to 100 (definitely allowed), which 
was anchored at 50 when the item was presented to participants. 
After this question, participants were asked, “Laws should be most 
concerned with the rights of: [intellectual] property owners vs. 
[intellectual] property users” (protection of rights). Participants again 
reported their answers on a slider scale ranging from 0 (owners) to 
100 (users) that was anchored at 50 when presented to participants. 
Legal compliance questions. Participants were next asked to 
answer two questions about their general level of support for 
property laws: (1) “How important is it for people to comply with 
property rights?” and (2) “How important is it for people to comply 
with intellectual property rights?” Participants responded to these 
questions using a slider scale ranging from 0 (extremely not 
important) to 100 (extremely important), which was anchored at 50 
when the item was presented to participants. Because participants’ 
scores on the two opinion questions were highly correlated to one 
another,127 we created a new factor to represent a construct we call 
Compliance Support, which is the average of scores on these two 
items. Higher Compliance Support scores indicate greater support 
for the compliance with property rights. 
Self-Construal Scale. To measure participants’ independent and 
interdependent self-construals (typically associated with Western 
and East Asian cultures, respectively), participants completed the 
Self-Construal Scale.128 This thirty-item scale includes a fifteen-item 
scale referring to an independent self-construal (e.g., “I enjoy being 
unique and different from others in many respects”) and a fifteen-
item scale referring to an interdependent self-construal (e.g., “Even 
when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an 
argument”). Participants were able to provide a response ranging 
from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). Critically, 
participants received separate scores for interdependent self-
construal129 and independent self-construal,130 as they were 
127. r = .67, p < .001. 
128. Theodore M. Singelis, The Measurement of Independent and Interdependent Self-
Construals, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 580 (1994). 
129. White Americans: Cronbach’s alpha = .70; East Asian Americans: Cronbach’s 
alpha = .79; East Asian: Cronbach’s alpha = .83. 
130. White Americans: Cronbach’s alpha = .66; East Asian Americans: Cronbach’s 
alpha = .75; East Asian: Cronbach’s alpha = .72. 
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designed to be separate constructs, each reflecting the average score 
of the fifteen pertinent items. 
Demographic questions. The demographic section of the survey 
included questions about participants’ age, gender, race/ethnicity, 
birthplace, age upon arrival in the United States, residence outside 
of the United States, political ideology, type of residence, and 
previous experience with law or law-related fields. For the law-
related experience items, participants were asked whether they 
themselves had “any current or past experience with law or law-
related fields (i.e., taken law classes or worked as a law clerk)” and 
whether they had “any close friends or family working in law or 
law-related fields[.]” Demographics by participant group are 
reported in Table 1. 
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Age (in years) M = 19.13 (1.74) M = 19.38 (1.64) M = 20.23 (3.32) 
Gender 
Male 45% 46% 39% 
Female 55% 53% 61% 
Other 0% 1% 0% 
Residence 
Urban 44% 27% 82% 
Suburban 45% 65% 15% 
Small Town 8% 4% 3% 
Rural 3% 4% 0% 
Political 
Ideology 
M = 34.60 
(26.76) 
M = 33.06 
(18.96) 




Yes 12% 8% 7% 
No 88% 92% 93% 
Family Law 
Experience 
Yes 28% 18% 12% 
No 72% 82% 88% 
Note: Political ideology was scored on a scale from 0 
(liberal/left) to 100 (conservative/right). 
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2. Study 1 results
Responses to the legal permissibility and protection of rights
vignette items were analyzed in two 4 (property domain: patent vs. 
copyright vs. personal vs. land) x 3 (transfer type: private-for-
private vs. private-for-public vs. public-for-public) x 3 (group: 
White American vs. East Asian American vs. East Asian) mixed 
measures ANOVAs131 with group as a between-subjects factor and 
domain and transfer type as within-subjects factors. The discussion 
below provides a detailed statistical report of the results. The 
implications of the results of both Study 1 and Study 2 are discussed 
in Part III. 
Analyses of the legal permissibility items revealed statistically 
significant variation across the different property domains.132 
Participants believed that using someone else’s personal property 
(M = 20.54, SD = 18.32) should be less permissible than using 
someone else’s intellectual property (patent: M = 32.70, SD = 20.68; 
copyright: M = 34.66, SD = 20.53) or land (M = 34.15, SD = 24.31).133 
The responses to the patent, copyright, and land scenarios, 
however, did not vary from one another (all ps = 1.0). 
The type of transfer also had a significant effect on respondents’ 
property rights evaluations.134 Participants believed that private-
for-private uses of property (M = 18.10, SD = 14.88) should be less 
allowed than private-for-public uses of property (M = 35.12, SD = 
21.86), or public-for-public uses of property (M = 38.32, SD = 
21.37).135 Further, participants believed that private-for-public uses 
of property should be less allowed than public-for-public uses of 
property (p = .022). However, whether a respondent was White 
American, East Asian American, or East Asian had no significant 
effect on their evaluation of legal permissibility (p = .405). 
131. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a statistic designed to isolate and 
evaluate the effect of independent variables on a continuous dependent variable.  
PAUL G. HOEL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 311–12 (5th ed. 1984); J. RICK 
TURNER & JULIAN THAYER, INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: DESIGN, ANALYSIS & 
INTERPRETATION (2001). 
132. F(3,462) = 33.71, p < .001, ηp2 = .18. 
133. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected): using personal property should be 
less permissible than using intellectual property, ps < .001, or land, p < .001. 
134. F(2,308) = 131.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .46. 
135. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected): private-for-private uses should be 
less allowed than private-for-public uses, p < .001, or public-for-public uses, p < .001. 
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The effects identified above were qualified by a significant 
interaction between the property domain and transfer type at 
issue.136 The differentiation based on transfer type existed for three 
of the four property domains—in the patent, copyright, and 
personal property scenarios, participants were more strict about 
private-for-private transfers compared with private-for-public 
transfers (all ps < .001), and more strict about private-for-private 
transfers compared with public-for-public transfer (all ps < .001), 
but judged private-for-public and public-for-public transfers as 
similar (all ps = 1.0). This pattern did not hold for the land scenarios, 
as participants judged all three transfer types similarly 
(all ps > .083). 
There was also a significant interaction between race/ethnicity 
and transfer type.137 The effect of transfer type noted above held 
within two of the three groups—in the White American and East 
Asian groups, participants were more strict about private-for-
private transfers compared to private-for-public transfers (all ps < 
.001), and more strict about private-for-private transfers compared 
to public-for-public transfers (all ps < .001), but judged private-for-
public and public-for-public transfers as similar (all ps > .899). 
However, this pattern did not hold for the East Asian Americans, 
as participants not only were more strict about private-for-private 
transfers compared to private-for-public transfers (p < .001), and 
more strict about private-for-private transfers compared to public-
for-public transfers (p < .001), but also were more strict about 
private-for-public transfers compared to public-for-public transfers 
(p = .011). No other interactions were significant (all ps > .336). The 
results of the legal permissibility questions are displayed in Figure 1 
and Table 2. 
136. F(6,924) = 32.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .17. 
137. F(4,308) = 2.96, p = .020, ηp2 = .04. 
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Figure 1. Study 1: Legal Permissibility Ratings of Vignettes by Transfer 





























































































Private for Private Private for Public Public for Public
219 Debunking Intellectual Property Myths 
251 
Table 2. Study 1: Legal Permissibility Ratings of Vignettes by Transfer 
Type, Domain, and Group. Higher values represent greater legal 
permissibility. 
White American 
Patent Copyright Personal Land 
Private for Private 9.35 9.8 6.98 33.14 
Private for Public 41.96 40.71 25.37 30.37 
Public for Public 40.55 43.76 25.12 37.51 
Asian American 
Patent Copyright Personal Land 
Private for Private 13.67 13.95 9.93 36.2 
Private for Public 44.03 49.17 24.7 31.67 
Public for Public 46.95 52.73 28.63 43.48 
East Asian 
Patent Copyright Personal Land 
Private for Private 18.46 21.41 12.48 31.83 
Private for Public 37.87 39.2 26.89 29.5 
Public for Public 41.5 41.17 24.78 33.63 
Similar to the legal permissibility responses, analyses of the 
protection of rights vignettes also revealed a statistically significant 
effect of property domain on participants’ responses.138 Participants 
were more likely to believe that laws should be more concerned 
with protecting the rights of property owners relative to property 
users in the case of personal property (M = 26.32, SD = 27.31) as 
138. F(3,420) = 8.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. 
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compared to both forms of intellectual property tested (patent: M = 
34.53, SD = 30.13; copyright: M = 35.07, SD = 29.24), and as 
compared to land (M = 32.04, SD = 26.46).139 Responses to the 
two intellectual property cases and land again did not differ 
(all ps > .808). 
Transfer type also had a significant effect on protection of rights 
evaluations.140 Respondents were more likely to believe that laws 
should be more concerned with protecting the rights of property 
owners in private-for-private uses of property (M = 23.64, SD = 
26.84) compared to both the private-for-public uses of property (M 
= 36.20, SD = 28.73), and the public-for-public uses of property (M 
= 36.14, SD = 29.29).141 Responses to the private-for-public uses of 
property and public-for-public uses of property did not differ (p = 
1.0). As with the legal permissibility questions, there was no 
significant effect of participants’ race/ethnicity on their responses 
(p = .284). 
These protection of rights effects were qualified by a significant 
interaction between the property domain and transfer type.142 This 
interaction revealed that the main effect of transfer type held within 
three of the four domains. In the patent, copyright, and personal 
property scenarios, participants were more likely to believe that the 
law should be concerned with the rights of the owner in private-
for-private transfers compared to private-for-public transfers (all ps 
< .001), as well as more likely to be concerned with rights of the 
owner in private-for-private transfers compared to public-for-
public transfers (all ps < .001), but judged private-for-public and 
public-for-public transfers as similar (all ps = 1.0). However, this 
pattern did not hold for the land scenarios, where participants 
judged all three transfer types similarly (all ps > .425). 
There was also a significant interaction between participants’ 
race/ethnicity and property domain responses, revealing that the 
main effect of domain occurred in the White American group, but 
139. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected): laws should protect the rights of 
property owners relative to property users in the case of personal property compared to both 
forms of intellectual property, ps < .001, and land, p = .025. 
140. F(2,280) = 37.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .037. 
141. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected): laws should be more concerned with 
protecting the rights of property owners in private-for-private uses of property compared to 
both the private-for-public uses of property, p < .001, and the public-for-public uses of 
property, p < .001. 
142. F(6,840) = 13.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .087. 
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not the other two groups.143 White American participants were 
more likely to believe that laws should be more concerned with 
protecting the rights of property owners in the case of personal 
property compared to both forms of intellectual property and land 
(all ps < .001), with the intellectual property and land domains 
being judged similarly (all ps = 1.0). East Asian American 
participants, on the other hand, were (marginally) more likely to 
believe that laws should be more concerned with protecting the 
rights of property owners in both the personal property and land 
domains compared to both intellectual property domains (all ps < 
.065). In this group, the personal property and land domains were 
judged similarly to one another (p = 1.0), and the two intellectual 
property domains were judged similarly to one another (p = 1.0). 
Further, the East Asian participants judged all four domains 
similarly with respect to whether the law should be concerned with 
rights of property owners or property users (all ps > .160). No other 
interactions were significant (all ps > .317). 
Turning to the questions about the importance of complying 
with laws, the three groups (White American, East Asian American, 
and East Asian) differed significantly in the degree to which they 
endorsed compliance with property and intellectual property 
laws.144 East Asian participants’ Compliance Support (M = 83.59, 
SD = 14.91) was significantly higher than that of both East Asian 
Americans (M = 75.45, SD = 16.75) and White Americans (M = 
75.90, SD = 19.23).145 The Compliance Support of East Asian 
American and White American participants did not differ 
significantly (p = .988). Each of the race/ethnicity groups scored 
significantly above the midpoint of the scale (50), indicating a 
tendency to prefer compliance with property and intellectual 
property law.146 
The three race/ethnicity groups differed significantly on their 
tendency to endorse independent self-construal147 but not on their 
143. F(3,420) = 2.72, p = .013, ηp2 = .037. 
144. F(2,186) = 4.39, p = .014, ηp2 = .05, one-way ANOVA. 
145. Posthoc Tukey tests: East Asian participants’ Compliance Support was 
significantly higher than that of East Asian American participants (p = .019) and White 
Americans (p = .043). 
146. White American: t(57) = 17.15, p < .001; East Asian American: t(73) = 13.07, p < .001; 
East Asian: t(56) = 10.17, p < .001. 
147. F(2,193) = 6.63, p = .002, ηp2 = .06. 
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tendency to endorse interdependent self-construal.148 White 
American participants (M = 4.90, SD = 0.57) had significantly 
higher independent self-construal than East Asian participants (M 
= 4.51, SD = 0.59; p = .001), but were no different than East Asian 
American participants (M = 4.69, SD = 0.59; p = .103). East Asian 
and East Asian American participants did not differ in their 
tendency to endorse independent self-construal (p = .174). 
Having completed Study 1 as a pilot study on cross-cultural 
attitudes towards property rights, we turned to Study 2. 
B. Study 2: Cross-Cultural Study of American
and Chinese College Students 
Study 1 yields several tantalizing results concerning differences 
in attitudes towards property across cultures. Because Study 1 
recruited only students at an American university, however, there 
is a significant chance that selection effects affected the East Asian 
participant population. That is, students from East Asian countries 
who attend college in the United States, even though they grew up 
in East Asia, may not be reflective of East Asian attitudes towards 
property rights in general. For Study 2, we turned to a comparison 
of college students at an American university and at a Chinese 
university. As in Study 1, none of the participants were engaged in 
the study of law. 
1. Study 2 methodology
Participants. Our final group of participants included 101 White
American college students from a university in the Pacific 
Northwest (who had not participated in Study 1) and 102 Chinese 
college students from a university in the Yunnan region of China.149 
The gender distribution of the study populations was similar, and 
the Chinese participants averaged slightly older than the 
Americans.150 White American participants were recruited both 
148. F(2,192) = 1.56, p = .213, ηp2 = .02. 
149. Yunnan is a large province in southern China, known for its diverse population, 
and is significantly less economically developed than Beijing or Shanghai. Ping-chia Kuo & 
Robert Lee Suettinger, Yunnan, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 8, 2016), https:// 
www.britannica.com/place/Yunnan. 
150. White American college students: Mage = 20.12 years, SD = 3.43 years; 67% female. 
Chinese college students: Mage = 23.42 years, SD = 5.57 years; 66% female. 
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through a university online participant pool system that 
compensated participants with course credit and through postings 
around campus that compensated participants with a $5 gift card 
for completing an online survey. Chinese participants were 
recruited through an announcement during their university 
courses, in which they were invited to visit a survey platform 
(Sojump.com) to complete the survey online. Upon completion of 
the survey, participants were compensated with 20 Yuan, which 
was determined by professors familiar with American and Chinese 
college students to provide a roughly similar incentive to the 
$5 gift card.151 
To be included in the analyses, White American participants 
had to be born in the United States and to not have lived outside of 
the United States for a significant time. Chinese students had to be 
born in China and to not have lived outside of China for a 
significant time. All participants were required to be at least 
eighteen years of age and no older than forty years of age.152 
Both the United States and China have rich cultural, ethnic, and 
racial variation within the societies. Our study, focused on White 
American college students and on Chinese college students from a 
single region in order to provide a comparison, does not explore 
this intracountry diversity, a topic that is worthy of further 
research. Nevertheless, we use the general terms “American” and 
“Chinese” in the text that follows for ease of discussion. 
As in Study 1, the study materials included (1) vignette 
evaluations, (2) legal compliance questions, (3) a self-construal 
scale, and (4) demographic questions. The survey material for the 
American participants was written in English, and the survey 
material for Chinese participants was written in Mandarin Chinese. 
The survey materials were translated from English by a native 
Mandarin speaker and were then back-translated to English by 
different bilingual translators in order to confirm the translation. 
Vignette evaluations. The vignettes were the same as those used 
in Study 1, with the exception of the three vignettes depicting use 
151. 20 Yuan was worth roughly $3.00 at the time of the study.
152. An additional 19 participants completed the study in the United States but were 
excluded from analyses for either not being the target race/ethnicity (n = 5) or having lived 
outside of the United States (n = 14). An additional 28 participants completed the study as 
part of the Chinese group but were excluded from analyses for either not being born in China 
(n = 8), having lived outside of China (n = 9), or being outside of the target ages (n = 11). 
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of someone’s real property. The land vignettes were modified to be 
about taking someone else’s land, rather than trespassing on land 
(as they were in Study 1). This change was made in order to better 
align the real property scenario with the intellectual property and 
personal property scenarios, as we were concerned that a single 
trespass on real property, causing no damage, might not have been 
a significant enough incursion on property rights relative to the 
other vignettes. None of the vignettes provide for compensation for 
the taken property rights. 
As in Study 1, participants read twelve total vignettes (that is, 
for each of the four property domains, vignettes involving a 
private-for-private transfer, a private-for-public transfer, and a 
public-for-public transfer). Following each vignette, participants 
were asked, “In your opinion, should the property user’s action be 
legally allowed?” Participants reported their answers to each 
question using a slider scale ranging from 0 (definitely not allowed) 
to 100 (definitely allowed), which was anchored at 50 when the item 
was presented to participants. Participants were not asked the 
second dependent variable question from Study 1 (concerning 
whether the law should be primarily concerned with the rights of 
[intellectual] property owners or users), because the responses in 
Study 1 were largely redundant, and removing the question 
addressed concerns about time limits in this study. 
Legal compliance questions. The legal compliance questions from 
Study 1 were slightly modified, such that participants were asked 
three questions: (1) “How important is it for people to comply with 
property rights in land?,” (2) “How important is it for people to 
comply with personal property rights (such as peoples’ clothes or 
books)?,” and (3) “How important is it for people to comply with 
intellectual property rights?” Participants responded to the 
questions using a slider scale ranging from 0 (extremely not 
important) to 100 (extremely important), which was anchored at 50 
when the item was presented to participants. Because participants’ 
scores on the three opinion questions were highly correlated to one 
another,153 we created a new factor to represent a construct we call 
Compliance Support, which is the average of scores on these three 
items. Higher Compliance Support scores indicate greater support 
for the compliance with property rights. 
153. American: Cronbach’s alpha = .76; Chinese: Cronbach’s alpha = .93.
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Self-Construal Scale. As in Study 1, participants completed the 
Self-Construal Scale.154 Again, both the independent155 and 
interdependent156 scales showed high reliability among the items 
within each scale. Therefore, the fifteen items on each scale were 
averaged to create an Independent Self-Construal score and an 
Interdependent Self-Construal score for each participant. 
Demographic questions. The demographic section of the survey 
included questions about participant age, gender, race/ethnicity, 
birthplace, age upon arrival in the United States/China, residence 
outside of the United States/China, academic major, year at 
university, and experience with law. For the law-related experience 
item, participants were asked whether they had “any current or 
past experience with law or law-related fields (i.e., taken law classes 
or worked as a law clerk).” Responses are provided in Table 3. 
154. Singelis, supra note 128, at 580. 
155. American: Cronbach’s alpha = .73; Chinese: Cronbach’s alpha = .87.
156. American: Cronbach’s alpha = .69; Chinese: Cronbach’s alpha = .91.
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Table 3. Demographics of Participants in Study 2. 
Variable American Chinese 
Age (in years) M = 20.12 (3.43) M = 23.42 (5.58) 
Gender 
Male 32% 34% 
Female 66% 66% 
Other 1% 0% 
Do not wish to report 1% 0% 
Academic Major 
Psychology 6% 15% 
Business 24% 26% 
Other Social Science 15% 7% 
Natural Science 16% 5% 
Humanities 13% 15% 
Other 18% 23% 
More than one 8% 9% 
Year at University 
First 40% 11% 
Second 23% 38% 
Third 23% 16% 
Fourth 13% 12% 
Fifth 1% 23% 
Law Experience 
Yes 25% 40% 
No 75% 60% 
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2. Study 2 results
Responses to all of the vignette items were analyzed in a 4
(property domain: patent vs. copyright vs. personal property vs. 
real property) x 3 (transfer type: private-for-private vs. private-for-
public vs. public-for-public) x 2 (group: American vs. Chinese) 
mixed measures ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor 
and domain and transfer type as within-subjects factors. All 
pairwise comparisons are Bonferroni corrected.157 
As in Study 1, analyses revealed that there was a statistically 
significant effect of the property domain on participant 
responses.158 Participants believed that using someone else’s 
personal property (M = 27.41, SD = 28.50) should be less 
permissible than using someone else’s intellectual property (patent: 
M = 38.22, SD = 32.99; copyright: M = 36.89, SD = 41.05; ps < .001) 
or real property (M = 34.74, SD = 31.43; p < .001). Responses for the 
two types of intellectual property and the real property cases did 
not differ from each other (all ps > .387). 
Analyses again revealed a significant effect of transfer type on 
vignette evaluations as well.159 The study respondents believed that 
private-for-private uses of property (M = 21.73, SD = 27.59) should 
be less allowed than private-for-public uses of property (M = 39.36, 
SD = 32.73; p < .001), or public-for-public uses of property (M = 
41.85, SD = 33.21; p < .001). Further, participants believed that 
private-for-public uses of property should be less allowed than 
public-for-public uses of property (p = .014). 
Contrary to Study 1, there was a significant effect of 
participants’ race/ethnicity on their property scenario 
evaluations.160 American participants (M = 28.36, SD = 26.23) were 
significantly more likely to say that the takings of property should 
not be allowed compared to Chinese participants (M = 40.27, 
SD = 32.80). 
157. The Bonferroni correction is a commonly used statistical tool applied when several 
statistical tests are performed simultaneously on a single data set. REBECCA M. WARNER, 
APPLIED STATISTICS: FROM BIVARIATE THROUGH MULTIVARIATE TECHNIQUES 98 (2d ed. 2013); 
see D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a 
Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 985 n.253 (2013) 
(noting the commonality of the Bonferroni correction). 
158. F(3,603) = 20.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. 
159. F(2,402) = 143.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .42. 
160. F(1,201) = 12.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. 
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The effects of property domain and transfer type described 
above were qualified by a significant interaction between them.161 
In each of the property domains, participants were more strict 
about the private-for-private transfers (M = 21.78, SD = 27.62) 
compared to the private-for-public transfers (M = 39.38, SD = 26.74) 
and the public-for-public transfers (M = 41.87, SD = 26.47; all ps < 
.001). However, while respondents were marginally more strict 
about the private-for-public transfers compared to the public-for-
public transfers in the copyright domain (p = .059), they evaluated 
the private-for-public and public-for-public transfers similarly in 
the patent (p = .175), personal property (p = 1.0), and real property 
(p = 1.0) domains. In addition, after plotting the results and seeing 
what appeared to be a difference across culture in the private-for-
private items, we explored whether Chinese and American 
participants differed in means for each type of transfer.162 We found 
that American participants (M = 11.17) were substantially more 
strict about private-for-private transfers than Chinese participants 
(M = 32.38),163 and American participants (M = 35.47) were also 
significantly more strict about private-for-public transfers than 
Chinese participants (M = 43.26).164 In contrast, the difference 
between American (M = 38.45) and Chinese participants (M = 45.26) 
for public-for-public transfers was not significant (p = .067). 
There was also a significant interaction between race/ethnicity 
and transfer type.165 This interaction revealed that both Chinese and 
Americans were more strict about the private-for-private transfers 
compared to the private-for-public transfers (all ps < .001), and the 
public-for-public transfers (all ps < .001). However, while the 
Chinese participants evaluated the private-for-public and public-
for-public scenarios as similar (p = .311), in contrast to Study 1, 
American participants were more strict about the private-for-public 
compared to the public-for-public scenarios (p = .049). 
Unlike Study 1, there was a significant interaction between 
race/ethnicity and property domain.166 This relationship revealed 
that the main effect of property domain—that participants were 
161. F(6,1206) = 3.88, p = .001, ηp2 = .019. 
162. These results may be taken with caution because they are post hoc. 
163. t(201) = 5.88, p < .001, d = .83. 
164. t(201) = 2.09, p = .038, d = .29. 
165. F(2,402) = 19.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. 
166. F(3,603) = 7.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .04. 
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more strict about the use of personal property than intellectual or 
real property—was stronger among American participants than 
among Chinese participants. American participants were 
significantly more likely to say taking property should not be 
allowed in the personal property domain compared to the 
intellectual property and land domains (ps < .001). Further, the 
American participants were more strict about the land domain 
compared to the copyright domain (p = .039); however, they were 
no more strict about land than about patent (p = .140), and 
evaluated copyright and patent statistically similarly (p = 1.0). On 
the other hand, Chinese participants were only significantly more 
strict about the personal property domain compared to the patent 
domain (p = .006). Aside from the aforementioned finding, and a 
marginally significant difference in participants’ responses to the 
personal property and land domains (p = .067), Chinese 
participants did not evaluate the four domains differentially 
(all ps > .474). 
Finally, these interactions were further qualified by a significant 
three-way interaction between race/ethnicity, transfer type, and 
property domain, suggesting some differences between cultures 
with respect to how domain and transfer type interact.167 The three-
way interaction revealed that American and Chinese participants 
show a similar pattern in response to the three transfer types in the 
patent, personal property, and land domains, such that in all three 
domains participants were more strict about private-for-private 
transfers compared to private-for-public transfers (all ps < .026), 
and compared to public-for-public transfers (all ps < .002), but 
evaluated the private-for-public and public-for-public transfers 
similarly (all ps > .415). The pattern of responses from American 
and Chinese groups differed slightly for the copyright domain. In 
the copyright domain, both groups were stricter about private-for-
private transfers compared to private-for-public transfers (ps < 
.001) and compared to public-for-public transfers (ps < .001). 
However, while Americans were more strict about private-for-
public transfers relative to public-for-public transfers (p = .024), 
Chinese participants evaluated these two scenarios similarly (p = 
1.0). The results of the Study 2 vignette evaluations are displayed 
in Figure 2. 
167. F(6,1206) = 4.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .02. 
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Figure 2. Study 2: Legal Permissibility Ratings of Vignettes by Transfer 
Type, Domain, and Group. 
In contrast to the East Asian and White American groups in 
Study 1 who differed on the legal compliance questions, Chinese 
and American participants in Study 2 did not differ in their 
responses on the legal compliance questions.168 Both American (M 
= 82.14, SD = 15.68) and Chinese (M = 78.22, SD = 26.78) participant 
Compliance Support scores averaged significantly above the 
midpoint (50), indicating a desire for compliance with property and 
intellectual property law.169 
On the self-construal scale, consistent with Study 1, the two 
groups differed significantly in their tendency to endorse 
independent self-construal,170 such that American participants 
reported higher independent self-construal (M = 4.75, SD = 0.63) 
than Chinese participants (M = 4.06, SD = 0.76). Unlike the groups 
in Study 1, the Study 2 groups also differed significantly in their 
tendency to endorse interdependent self-construal,171 such that 
168. t(201) = 1.27, p = .204. 
169. American: t(100) = 20.59, p < .001; Chinese: t(101) = 10.64, p < .001. 
170. t(201) = 6.98, p < .001, d = .99. 
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American participants (somewhat counterintuitively) reported 
higher interdependent self-construal (M = 4.90, SD = 0.54) than 
Chinese participants (M = 4.21, SD = 0.78). The results of the studies 
are discussed in Part III. 
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING CULTURE, PROPERTY,
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXCEPTIONALISM
For decades, the common perception across much of the 
Western world has been that Chinese do not respect intellectual 
property rights.172 This critique is based on the perception that 
Chinese attitudes towards intellectual property rights are in some 
way exceptional, different from what they should be and different 
from other people’s attitudes towards intellectual property rights. 
The results of our experiments indicate that these attributions may 
be accurate in some respects, but not in others. The results strongly 
suggest that both American and Chinese attitudes towards 
intellectual property rights are more complex than previously 
realized. Our studies also indicate that perhaps we should be 
exploring a different exceptionalism question: Why do Americans 
differentiate their preferences for intellectual property rights so 
starkly from their preferences for other property rights? 
As with all experimental work, the conclusions we draw from 
our results are limited by the representativeness of the samples. 
Our participants were college students, drawn from a single 
campus in the United States and a single campus in China. These 
samples may not be representative of the cultures at large. It is 
possible that American and Chinese college students are more 
culturally aligned with each other than American and Chinese 
populations in general, due to sharing an age cohort, the 
globalization of information and some aspects of culture, or other 
factors. The discussion below assumes that the American and 
Chinese populations that we sampled are at least somewhat 
representative of American and Chinese populations at large. 
A. American Preferences for Stronger Property Rights Are Contextual
The survey experiments provide varied results concerning
whether Americans tend to prefer stronger property rights than 
172. See supra Part I. 
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Chinese. On the one hand, there was no statistically significant 
difference in American and Chinese responses to the general 
questions on whether it was important to comply with real 
property rights, personal property rights, and intellectual property 
rights. On the other hand, Americans indicated stronger property 
rights preferences in the vignette responses overall. 
One possible explanation for these seemingly inconsistent 
outcomes is that the variation may result from differences in the 
issues that people from each culture default to conceptually when 
asked about property rights without context. When queried in the 
abstract about support for property rights, there is substantial 
consistency across the cultures. When subjects are asked about 
specific scenarios, however, their responses and the consistency 
across cultures is more nuanced. 
In the vignettes, Americans tended to demonstrate a preference 
for stronger property rights than the Chinese. Chinese participants’ 
permissibility ratings averaged higher than Americans’ for each 
type of property and for each type of transfer.173 Examining the 
twelve vignettes individually, Chinese permissibility ratings 
significantly exceeded American permissibility ratings in eight of 
the vignettes and were statistically equivalent in the other four.174 
The American preference for stronger property rights than 
those preferred by Chinese appeared across all private-for-private 
scenarios, though not all private-for-public or public-for-public 
scenarios. In the scenarios that involve taking property for public 
purposes (whether by a private or public entity), Americans and 
Chinese have more similar responses to each other. In these 
circumstances, American and Chinese preferences are statistically 
similar in both the patent and copyright conditions, while 
Americans prefer slightly stronger rights in the personal property 
and land scenarios. Americans do not prefer stronger property 
rights to Chinese overall—rather, American preferences for 
property rights in comparison to Chinese preferences are highly 
context dependent. 
173. Although there were significant differences across cultural groups in Study 2, such 
differences were not found in Study 1. These results may indicate that there is a selection 
effect among East Asians who choose to come to college in the United States. Such 
individuals may bear property rights attitudes that are more similar to American attitudes. 
174. The four that are equivalent, as noted in the prior section, concern patent and 
copyright protection when the taking is for a public purpose. 
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B. Chinese Consistency, American Variation
One overarching result across the twelve vignette scenarios is 
that Chinese tended to view property rights significantly more 
consistently than did Americans. This uniformity held across the 
type of property, the entity taking the property, and the use to 
which the property was being put. As one indicator of this 
difference in variance, average Chinese responses across the twelve 
scenarios varied by about fifty percent, while American responses 
varied tenfold. This Chinese consistency across property domains 
is also revealed in participants’ responses to the general property 
rights legal compliance questions. Here, the Chinese responses 
across personal, real, and intellectual property displayed a higher 
correlation than the American responses. 
The Chinese consistency likely derives, at least in part, from 
millennia of viewing all property as belonging to the Emperor, and 
all people as the Emperor’s subjects. It may also have roots in the 
history of property redistribution in China. These perspectives of 
state ownership of all property would tend to remove distinctions 
between different types of property and between public versus 
private property rights. 
The American variation in responses here is somewhat 
beguiling in two regards. First, when queried in the abstract about 
the importance of complying with both property rights in general 
and intellectual property rights in particular, Americans rate such 
importance relatively consistently across the different domains (as 
do Chinese). When queried about specific factual patterns, 
however, only Americans draw sharp distinctions. 
Second, the distinctions that Americans draw across different 
types of property rights are largely inconsistent with the U.S. law. 
Although property laws concerning tangible personal goods, land, 
and intellectual property do not mirror each other precisely, in 
general, the law does not differentiate between the taking of 
intangible property versus tangible property or the taking of 
property (by a private party) for a publicly directed versus 
privately directed purpose. There appears to be a significant 
disconnect between American preferences for property law and the 
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law on the books,175 a disconnect that is not limited to a distinction 
between tangible and intangible property. 
In this context, it is worth noting that we did not find 
race/ethnicity differences in Study 1. There, White Americans, East 
Asian Americans, and East Asians all had statistically similar 
responses to each other on property rights. The divergence between 
Americans and Chinese respondents in Study 2, on the other hand, 
provides evidence that East Asian Americans and East Asians who 
choose to attend college in the United States are culturally more 
similar to Americans than are other Chinese, at least with respect 
to property rights. 
C. Chinese Intellectual Property Exceptionalism, or American?
Our results suggest that those on all sides of the debates over 
the origins of Chinese attitudes towards intellectual property rights 
miss the mark in certain regards. Both those who argue that 
Chinese attitudes are based in Confucian history and those who 
disagree built their arguments by focusing on Chinese cultural and 
legal developments in contrast to Western notions. That is, all 
parties assumed some form of intellectual property exceptionalism 
in Chinese culture. The studies reported here indicate that this is 
not the case. 
First, whatever the basis for Chinese attitudes towards 
intellectual property rights, these attitudes appear to track Chinese 
attitudes towards tangible property closely. Correlation does not 
prove causation, but one likely explanation for this relationship is 
that the basis for Chinese attitudes towards intellectual property is 
the same as the basis for their attitude towards all property. To the 
extent Chinese attitudes are exceptional, it is not their attitudes 
towards intellectual property that are exceptional, but their 
attitudes towards property in general. 
Second, Chinese attitudes towards intellectual property bear a 
significant resemblance to American attitudes towards intellectual 
property in certain regards. In both the copyright and patent 
175. Other research similarly has documented a disconnect between American beliefs 
about what intellectual property law should be and what the law actually is. Anne A. Fast, 
Kristina R. Olson & Gregory N. Mandel, Intuitive Intellectual Property Law: A Nationally-
Representative Test of the Plagiarism Fallacy, 12(9) PLoS ONE e0184315 (2017); Gregory N. 
Mandel, The Public Perception of Intellectual Property, 66 FLA. L. REV. 261, 308 (2014); Plagiarism 
Fallacy, supra note 23, at 971. 
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protection scenarios, Americans and Chinese had statistically 
similar responses for both private and public takings so long as they 
are for public benefit. The Chinese and American responses in the 
personal and real property scenarios deviated to a greater extent 
than the intellectual property scenarios. Here, the Chinese 
preferred weaker property protection in each of the three transfer 
type contexts. 
D. Purpose Matters
As noted above, Americans see a sharp distinction concerning 
the use to which taken property is put. Americans consider it 
significantly more acceptable for private or public parties to take 
property for a public purpose than it is to take property for a private 
purpose. This differentiation holds across all four types of property 
tested here. Chinese participants display some distinction 
concerning use as well, though not as sharp as Americans in any of 
the four property domains. 
On the other hand, neither Chinese nor Americans tended to 
draw much of a distinction based on the user taking the property—
private or public.176 In other words, when the purpose of the taking 
is held constant (that is, for a public purpose), respondents in each 
domain did not distinguish between private versus public entities 
engaging in the taking. These preferences run contrary to the law. 
In both the United States and China, the legal consequences of 
taking property can depend on whether it is a private party or the 
government that is taking the property.177 
Policymakers and scholars have long debated whether the 
objectives of property law should be utilitarian or deontological in 
nature. Utilitarians argue that property laws should be designed 
instrumentally, to provide incentives for private parties to put 
property to its highest social use.178 Some contend that efficiency 
176. Chinese participants did not draw a significant distinction between the private-
for-public and public-for-public vignettes for any of the property types. Americans similarly 
did not draw a significant distinction for personal, real, or patent property, but did draw a 
distinction for copyright. 
177. Jan G. Laitos & Teresa Helms Abel, The Role of Causation When Determining the 
Proper Defendant in a Takings Lawsuit, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1181, 1182–83 (2012); Dennis 
Schmelzer, Takings for Granted: The Convergence and Non-Convergence of Property Law in the 
People’s Republic of China and the United States, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 133, 138 (2008). 
178. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40 (9th ed. 2014); Abraham Bell 
& Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 547 (2005). 
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objectives are the reason that society developed property laws in 
the first instance, for example in an effort to resolve the tragedy of 
the commons.179 While utilitarian views of property are 
consequentialist, deontologists focus on people’s moral entitlement 
to certain property rights.180 Most famously, for example, 
John Locke’s labor theory of property rights posits that people 
are naturally entitled to the fruits of their efforts.181 Rather than 
taking an instrumentalist view of property law, deontological 
proponents contend that there is and should be a moral basis for 
property law.182 
The results described above shed some light on how the public 
tends to view property rights. In addition to being contrary to the 
law, the American and Chinese distinctions in the study scenarios 
according to the use of the property in question, but not according 
to the user, are contrary to deontological conceptions of private 
property rights.183 If private individuals are morally entitled to their 
property interests, then the permissibility of a taking or 
infringement should not depend on the use to which the property 
is being put.184 Permissibility views that depend on the use to which 
the property is put are more consistent with a utilitarian perception 
of property rights.185 Across the personal, real, and intellectual 
property scenarios tested here, the instrumentalist outcomes of the 
use of property affected participant responses. 
There was a significant public outcry in the United States 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New 
London,186 which upheld the City’s exercise of their eminent domain 
179. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Demsetz, 
supra note 98, at 356. 
180. Micah Elazar, “Public Use” and the Justification of Takings, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 249, 
253 (2004); Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2203, 2210 (1992). 
181. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (Thomas P. Reardon ed., 
Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 11–12 (1985). 
182. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 45, at 52 (S.W. Dyde trans., 1996) (1896); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); Merrill & Smith, 
supra note 99, at 1894. 
183. Elazar, supra note 180, at 253; Hurd, supra note 180, at 2210. 
184. D. Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 36, 40–41 (2009); 
Merrill & Smith, supra note 99, at 1882. 
185. POSNER, supra note 178, at 41; Merrill & Smith, supra note 99, at 1881–82. 
186. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman 
Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective 
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power in taking real property.187 The Court in Kelo focused on the 
public use to which the property would be put in upholding the 
government’s action under the Takings Clause of the 
Constitution.188 This study suggests that the Court’s focus on public 
use is consistent with public preferences for how property rights 
should be determined in general. The negative reaction to Kelo thus 
may have had more to do with whether the use in question was 
actually public—here, a governmental taking exercised by a private 
party for development purposes189—than whether it was 
inappropriate for the Court to focus on public use in takings 
cases.190 These results are consistent with an earlier property rights 
study in relation to Kelo, which found that Americans believed that 
a government taking of real property was more justified when the 
planned use had a more legitimate public purpose.191 
E. Preferencing Personal Property
Another finding that stands out in the results is the participants’ 
preference for protecting personal property rights. Both Americans 
and Chinese concluded that personal property rights should be 
protected more rigorously than other types of property rights. 
Strikingly, this preference for personal property rights over rights 
in land existed whether the land vignette involved merely trespass 
(Study 1) or the full taking of real property (Study 2). 
American participants responded across the board that 
personal property rights should be protected to a greater extent 
Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 713 (2008); Timothy Sandefur, The 
“Backlash” So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 709, 711 (2006) (discussing the moral outrage about the Kelo decision and how this 
backlash was inspiring statutory reforms in state legislatures); Ilya Somin, The Limits of 
Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2101 (2009) (reporting 
on a survey of public opinion about Kelo and concluding, “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision 
in Kelo v. City of New London generated a massive backlash from across the political 
spectrum”). But see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1412 (2006) (surveying the academic criticism of Kelo and arguing that they 
are ill-conceived and misguided). 
187. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469. 
188. Id. at 488–89. 
189. Id. at 483–86. 
190. See John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783 
(2006) (arguing that the public use doctrine developed in Kelo does not adequately protect 
against the taking of residential property). 
191. See generally Nadler & Diamond, supra note 186. 
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than other types of property rights. Chinese participants responded 
that personal property rights should be more protected than land 
or patents, and their ratings for personal property and copyright 
did not statistically differ. 
The comparison between the personal property and copyright 
vignettes is particularly worthy of note. In the former, the 
individual at issue in the scenario takes fifty tangible copies of a 
textbook and sells them to college classmates. In the latter, the 
individual scans a copyrighted textbook and sells access to fifty 
college classmates. In each scenario the property owner incurs the 
same financial loss. Americans viewed these two scenarios starkly 
differently, while Chinese viewed them similarly. 
In the context of Kelo, it is worth noting that the government’s 
constitutional takings power applies equally to personal 
property192 and effectively to intellectual property as well.193 Given 
the preferences for personal property protection expressed by the 
study participants here, it is possible that the public outcry against 
takings would be even stronger in a personal property case than it 
was in Kelo.194 
Professor Margaret Radin famously posited that some property 
is “personal,” not in the traditional sense of “personal property,” 
but in the sense that ownership and control over it is essential to 
individual personhood.195 This normative view of property law 
192. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015); Steven J. Eagle, Property Rights 
After Horne, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 669 (2016). 
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (mandating that the government pay “reasonable and entire 
compensation” (a) “whenever an invention . . . covered by a patent . . . is used or 
manufactured by or for the United States” and (b) “whenever the copyright in any work 
protected under the copyright laws [is] infringed by the United States”); Thomas F. Cotter, 
Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 531–
32 (1998) (noting that “the Federal Tort Claims Act permits trademark owners to file claims 
against the United States for the violation of state trademark law” and that even though “no 
federal statute explicitly authorizes suits against the United States for violations of federal 
trademark law . . . , if the federal government’s dilution of a trademark can be characterized 
as a taking of private property for public use, the owner may be able to obtain compensation 
from the government under the Tucker Act”). 
194. Professor Stephanie Stern has argued that there is scant empirical support for the 
strong emphasis that legislators placed on the psychological primacy of residential property 
rights following Kelo. Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of 
Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (2009). The results here do not speak significantly to the 
ownership of home but do provide empirical support for the value that people place on 
personal property. 
195. Radin, supra note 182, at 957–58. 
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suggests that certain property is integral to personal autonomy, 
liberty, and human flourishing, and that property rights should be 
protected in order to promote such goals.196 Other property, Radin 
argues, is “fungible”; it can be bought and sold without injury to 
personhood interests, and therefore should be entitled to lesser 
protection.197 The results here provide some support for Radin’s 
personhood theory of property law. For even seemingly mundane 
property, such as textbooks, the study participants attached 
meaning to the ownership of the object in question. 
F. The Psychology of Property Rights
With regard to self-construal, the results of these studies were 
mixed. Consistent with considerable past work,198 in Studies 1 and 
2, White American participants endorsed independent self-
construal more than East Asian students (Study 1) and Chinese 
students (Study 2), but did not differ from East Asian American 
students (Study 1). In contrast, we did not observe the expected 
difference on interdependent self-construal. In Study 1, the groups 
did not differ in their level of interdependence, and in Study 2, 
White Americans actually endorsed an interdependent self-
construal more than Chinese participants. Whether the latter effect 
was a spurious finding, the result of translation difficulties (that 
somehow had not affected the independent measure), a product of 
the uniqueness associated with college student populations, or a 
reflection of a generational change since the scale was first 
constructed,199 is an open question. Nonetheless, these findings 
demonstrate that in making comparisons across countries, based on 
assumptions of cultural differences, it remains critical to continue 
to measure these cultural differences as it may not be fair to assume 
they remain constant across time or study. 
We can also speculatively connect the vignette ratings to the 
self-construal findings. The disapproval of the private-for-private 
case was especially strong among Americans. Perhaps their higher 
rates of both independent self-construal and interdependent 
196. Id. Contra Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory 
of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 350–52 (1993). 
197. Radin, supra note 182, at 978–79. 
198. Oyserman et al., supra note 119, at 3–72. 
199. Singelis, supra note 128, at 580. 
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self-construal particularly impacted this case. In private-for-private 
transfers, the personal costs to the owner (which might be 
especially salient to someone with an independent self-construal) 
were not outweighed by a concern for the larger group (which 
might be salient to someone with an interdependent self-construal). 
The literature on self-construal has investigated how self-construal 
can influence cognition. For example, representations of the self can 
impact spatial judgments,200 attention to context,201 and 
engagement in situational versus dispositional attributions.202 The 
current findings add to this work by suggesting that self-construal 
may also be useful in thinking about third-party judgments. 
Further, the current findings expand the psychology of 
ownership literature by demonstrating that people’s intuitions 
about the acceptability of using another’s property shift as a 
function of how (or for whom) that property is used. Previous 
research demonstrated that adults and even young children focus 
on current ownership when determining who has control over use 
of an object, even when a non-owner could more effectively use the 
object.203 However, when faced with dilemmas about an owner’s 
property being used against the owner’s will in order to prevent 
harm to others, adults and children as young as four years of age 
will deny the rights of owners in favor of the good deed.204 In the 
current work, we observed that whom the use benefited impacted 
the perceived acceptability of using the property. We found that 
people in both cultures viewed property used for the public 
similarly and more favorably than property used for private use, 
suggesting a common underlying utilitarian approach to 
evaluating these scenarios. That is, across cultures, helping more 
people was particularly important. This finding is consistent with 
200. Aradhna Krishna et al., The Effect of Self-Construal on Spatial Judgments, 35 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 337, 337–48 (2008). 
201. Richard S. Lewis et al., Culture and Context: East Asian American and European 
American Differences in P3 Event-Related Potentials and Self-Construal, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. BULL. 623, 623–34 (2008). 
202. Morris & Peng, supra note 12, at 949–71; Shigehiro Oishi et al., Cultural Variation in 
the Use of Current Life Satisfaction to Predict the Future, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 434, 
434–45 (2000). 
203. Sunae Kim & Charles W. Kalish, Children’s Ascriptions of Property Rights with 
Changes of Ownership, 24 COGNITIVE DEV. 322, 322–36 (2009). 
204. Karen R. Neary & Ori Friedman, Young Children Give Priority to Ownership When 
Judging Who Should Use an Object, 85 CHILD DEV. 326, 326–37 (2013). 
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other findings in moral psychology in which providing a benefit for 
greater numbers of people is generally favored.205 
CONCLUSION 
For years, legal and policy experts have debated and critiqued 
Chinese approaches to intellectual property rights. Despite a 
plethora of discussion on the matter, no one has previously tested 
actual American and Chinese property rights attitudes. The studies 
reported here present a first step forward. The results indicate that 
Americans and Chinese have richer and more complex preferences 
for property rights than previously considered, and that 
comparison of attitudes across cultures is not as straightforward as 
commonly assumed. 
While Americans do tend to prefer stronger property rights, 
they do not do so in all situations, and their responses are 
significantly mediated by the context. Chinese are more consistent 
in their property rights views, though, like Americans, their 
preferences often do not align with actual law. 
The variations across and complexities within each culture are 
likely intertwined with the historical and cultural differences across 
the two societies. While our results offer significant new 
information concerning American and Chinese preferences for 
property rights, they also only begin to scratch the surface. Both the 
United States and China have rich cultural diversity within their 
societies, which our studies did not explore.  Beyond China and the 
United States there are many other countries whose differing 
histories and cultures likely yield alternative perspectives on 
property. The studies reported here open up many new avenues for 
research concerning property, intellectual property, and culture. 
205. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL
THEORY (William Parent ed., 1986); Paul Conway & Bertram Gawronski, Deontological and 
Utilitarian Inclinations in Moral Decision Making: A Process Dissociation Approach, 104 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 216, 216–35 (2013); Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation 
of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105, 2105–08 (2001). 
